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ABSTRACT 
 
How Credit Market Conditions 
Impact the Effect of Voluntary Disclosure 
 on Firms’ Cost of Debt Capital. (August 2012) 
Bret Westman Scott, B.A., Western Washington University, 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas C. Omer 
 
 Prior literature finds that firms incur a lower cost of debt capital when they 
voluntarily disclose information.  However, the economic literature demonstrates that 
creditors’ lending standards become more stringent (lax) when credit is rationed 
(abundant) suggesting that they value voluntary disclosure from borrowers differentially 
across credit market regimes.  I draw upon the economic and finance literature on credit 
rationing to test whether the effects of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital 
is greater during periods of credit rationing.  I provide some evidence that confirms this 
prediction.  Moreover, I provide some evidence that this relation is stronger for smaller 
firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing suggesting that creditors value 
voluntary disclosure more from firms that have fewer resources to cover the increased 
agency cost of lending during periods of credit rationing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
This study investigates how the observed relationship between firms’ cost of debt 
capital and voluntary disclosure is influenced by credit market conditions.  Specifically, 
I test whether creditors’ sensitivity to conference call and earnings guidance frequency 
depends on the degree of rationing in the credit markets.  Creditors’ uncertainty about 
debt repayments vary with economic outlook (Rajan 1994; Ruckes 2004).  For example, 
when creditors are pessimistic, credit is rationed and creditors’ screening and monitoring 
efforts increase.  While creditors have access to private information to satisfy 
information needs during periods of economic uncertainty (Rajan 1994; Jorion et al. 
2005; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006; Frost 2007), information acquisition and 
processing is costly (Ruckes 2004; Bonner 2008).  Borrowers can partially subsidize the 
cost of monitoring by voluntarily disclosing financial information (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm 1993) suggesting that voluntary disclosure becomes more important to 
creditors when credit is rationed.  Thus, while prior literature finds that greater voluntary 
disclosure reduces firms’ cost of debt capital (Sengupta 1998); I expect voluntary 
disclosure will have a greater effect on firms’ cost of debt capital during periods of credit 
rationing. 
Understanding the influence of creditor uncertainty and their use of voluntary 
disclosure to discriminate among potential borrowers is important for regulators and 
legislators who have, in the past decade, called for greater financial disclosure by way of 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to increase 
investor protection.  If the importance of disclosure in debt contracts varies with 
creditors’ economic outlook, as prior research suggests (e.g. Rajan 1994; Weinberg 
1995), then regulatory reform mandating greater financial disclosure may not effectively 
increase investor protection as intended.  Also, understanding the variability in the 
influence of voluntary disclosures is important to firms who use voluntary disclosures 
strategically to influence capital market responses to heightened uncertainty (e.g. 
Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Soffer et al. 2000; Brown et al. 2005).  Firms may 
be able to influence their access to debt capital during periods of credit rationing by 
subsidizing creditors’ monitoring costs with additional financial disclosure (Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1997).  Also, prior literature finds that firms are more (less) forthcoming with 
financial information during periods of positive (negative) expected earnings (Miller 
2002).  Understanding how creditors respond differentially to voluntary disclosure 
across credit market conditions would be of value to firms who contemplate adjusting 
their voluntary disclosure policy, especially during periods of credit rationing. 
To test whether creditor uncertainty affects the extent to which creditors’ use 
voluntary disclosure to discriminate among potential borrowers, I examine the 
association of conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency with firms’ 
credit rating scores and interest rates across credit market conditions.  Firms that 
voluntarily disclose financial information through conference calls and / or earnings 
guidance convey confidence and certainty in their financial reports while reducing the 
information asymmetry component of firms’ cost of capital (Trueman 1986; Diamond 
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and Verrecchia 1991; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Brown et al. 2004).  If the association 
between conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency and firms’ credit 
rating scores and interest rates varies across credit market conditions, it implies that 
creditors are more (less) sensitive to voluntary disclosure during periods when credit is 
constrained (abundant) and thus simply mandating greater financial reporting may not 
effectively increase investor protection as intended.  Alternatively, if the cost of greater 
financial disclosure is recognized by creditors as a long-term investment by borrowers 
that decreases the likelihood of financial insolvency, or if creditors work directly to 
obtain nonpublic (i.e. private) disclosure to satisfy increased information demands, I 
would expect no difference in association between voluntary disclosure and firms’ cost 
of debt capital across periods of credit rationing / abundance. 
I find some evidence that greater conference call disclosure frequency improves 
firms’ credit ratings and reduces firms’ interest rates more during periods of credit 
rationing.  I also find some evidence that greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
improves firms’ credit rating scores and reduces firms’ interest rates during periods of 
credit rationing.  These results suggest that the influence of voluntary disclosure on 
firms’ cost of debt capital is greater when credit is constrained, and that creditors value 
public disclosure more during periods of uncertainty as means of subsidizing increased 
monitoring costs. 
I also examine whether the effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt 
capital during periods of credit rationing is conditional on firm size.  Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) suggest that smaller firms are more likely to be denied credit when credit 
4 
 
 
is rationed because smaller firms have fewer resources available to cover increased 
agency costs of lending during periods of credit rationing.  Additionally, prior studies 
find that smaller firms have more opaque information environments relative to larger 
firms (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1993) suggesting that voluntary disclosure plays a larger 
role in debt contracting for smaller firms.  My findings indicate that both conference call 
disclosure frequency and earnings guidance disclosure frequency improve firms’ credit 
ratings and reduce firms’ interest rates more for smaller firms than larger firms during 
periods of credit rationing suggesting that voluntary disclosure is more important to 
creditors of smaller firms than larger firms when credit becomes constrained. 
My study contributes to extant literature by examining how credit market 
conditions affect the relation between voluntary disclosure and the cost of debt capital 
documented in prior literature.  Anecdotal evidence of lax lending standards during the 
“easy credit” period of 2004-2006 (Acharya et al. 2009b) suggests that the importance of 
financial disclosure attenuates during periods of credit abundance.  Prior economic 
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literature also finds that screening and monitoring efforts of creditors become more strict 
(lax) during periods of credit rationing (abundance) (e.g. Rajan 1994; Ruckes 2004).  My 
study adds to extant literature by demonstrating that creditors’ use of voluntary 
disclosure varies in degree of influence and direction of association depending on 
whether credit is rationed or abundant, and that this result occurs despite increased 
financial disclosure since the passage of SOX (Jain et al. 2008). 
Also, prior literature finds the issuance of earnings guidance is on the decline 
which is likely in response to criticism surrounding such disclosure (Houston et al. 
2010).  This paper contributes to this stream of literature by suggesting that earnings 
guidance may be more valuable to both issuers and users of earnings guidance, 
especially in times of economic and financial uncertainty. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  The background and 
hypotheses development for this paper are presented in section 2, while the data and 
methodology discussion are presented in section 3.  Section 4 presents univariate 
statistics, and Section 5 presents results from testing.  Section 6 documents the 
conclusions. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 The Agency Problem 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that agency problems arise out of the 
separation of ownership and control.  When an owner (i.e. principal) delegates 
managerial responsibilities to the firm manager (i.e. agent), the agent typically has 
access to information that the principal does not.  This information may be useful to the 
principal in making investment and contracting decisions.  Without full access to such 
information, an adverse selection dilemma is created which can result in an increased 
cost of capital.   
2.2 Financial Disclosure and the Cost of Debt Capital 
 Prior theoretical literature suggests that, because investors are rational, firms will 
provide full disclosure to attract outside investment (Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981).  
Yet, given that full disclosure is costly, firms are more likely to use discretion when 
determining the optimum threshold level of disclosure (Verrecchia 1983).  Thus, while 
managers may not voluntarily provide full disclosure, the optimum threshold level of 
disclosure they do provide mitigates the information asymmetry and accompanying 
adverse selection problem faced by investors, which in turn reduces the risk premium 
charged by investors (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991).  
Thus, firms must weigh the cost of increased disclosure against the benefit of reduced 
cost of capital.   
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Several studies examine the capital market consequences of firms’ voluntary 
financial disclosure policies by employing various proxies for voluntary disclosure.  
Welker (1995) finds that firms with higher financial disclosure ratings, such as those 
published by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), have 
lower bid-ask spreads.  Similarly, other studies find that firms with higher AIMR scores 
attract greater investor interest, have greater stock liquidity, and have a lower cost of 
equity capital (Botosan 1997; Healy et al. 1999).  Sengupta (1998) examines the effect 
of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital and finds that greater AIMR scores 
are associated with higher credit ratings and, thus, a lower cost of debt capital.  Prior 
studies also use earnings guidance as a proxy for voluntary disclosure and find that 
earnings guidance reduces the information asymmetry component of firms’ cost of 
capital as evidenced by lower bid-ask spreads and higher equity price offerings (Coller 
and Yohn 1997; Lang and Lundholm 2000).  Additionally, Frankel et al. (1995) find that 
firms issue earnings guidance more frequently when they regularly access financing 
from the capital markets.  Conference calls, another proxy for voluntary disclosure, have 
been shown to be negatively associated with information asymmetry, and this effect is 
stronger for firms that regularly hold conference calls (Brown et al. 2004).  Furthermore, 
firms that voluntarily disclose through conference calls have greater stock liquidity 
(Frankel et al. 1999).  Taken together, these studies are consistent with the theoretical 
literature that finds greater voluntary disclosure reduces agency problems arising from 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, which reduces perceived 
investment risk and results in a lower cost of capital. 
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A key feature in the underlying disclosure-cost of capital literature above is the 
mediating role of risk.  Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) discuss 
how risk is the mediating factor that links the effect of financial disclosure to firms’ cost 
of capital.  The role of risk as a mediating factor relies on the assumption that financial 
disclosure will influence investors’ perceived risk of investment.  However, this 
assumption depends on investors’ risk tolerance.  In debt contracting, if creditors are 
risk-averse (i.e. have a low risk-tolerance), they will likely value voluntary disclosure 
because it provides greater assurance that debt obligations will be repaid.  Yet, if 
creditors are risk-neutral or risk-seeking (i.e. have a high risk-tolerance), it is unclear 
whether voluntary disclosure will influence debt contracting decisions.  If creditors’ risk 
tolerance ultimately impacts the effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt 
capital then it is important to understand what factors influence creditors’ risk tolerance 
and whether creditors’ risk tolerance is static or variable.   
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2.3 Variation in Creditors’ Risk Tolerance 
Prior literature finds that, on average, creditors’ risk tolerance varies with their 
forecasts of future economic conditions (Schreft and Owens 1991; Rajan 1994), and that 
their risk tolerance cycles between periods of credit rationing and credit abundance 
(Wojnilower 1980; Bernanke et al. 1991; Schreft and Owens 1991 and 1995; Asea and 
Blomberg 1998; Lown and Morgan 2006).  When creditors’ economic outlook is 
pessimistic, their forecasted probability of borrower default increases and their overall 
risk tolerance decreases (Asea and Blomberg 1998; Ruckes 2004).  As a result, screening 
and monitoring efforts increase, the price of loans increases, credit standards become 
strict, and fewer loans are extended to borrowers (Ruckes 2004).  Periods in which this 
occurs are referred to as credit rationing periods; periods when creditors’ risk tolerance 
and overall credit availability is low resulting in excess demand for loanable funds 
(Jaffee and Russell 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Williamson 1986; Jaffee and Stiglitz 
1990).    
In contrast, when creditors’ economic outlook is optimistic, their forecasted 
probability of borrower default decreases and their overall risk tolerance increases (Asea 
and Blomberg 1998).  As a result, screening and monitoring efforts decline, the price of 
loans (e.g. interest rate) declines, credit standards become lax, and loans are extended to 
lower quality borrowers (Ruckes 2004).  Periods in which this occurs are referred to as 
credit abundance periods; periods when creditors’ risk tolerance and overall credit 
availability is high.  Under such conditions, even poorly qualified borrowers obtain 
10 
 
 
credit when they otherwise would not (e.g. Rajan 1994; Black and de Meza 1994; 
Weinberg 1995).   
 Much of the activity both preceding and during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
corroborates the evidence cited above regarding the effect of varying investor risk 
tolerance.  Richardson (2009) finds that much of the cause for the Financial Crisis can be 
attributed to the excessive risk-taking activities of financial institutions.  One such 
activity was the exploitation of originate-to-distribute model of securitization 
(Richardson 2009), a process by which loans are packaged into securities and sold to 
investors.  Cooley and Philippon (2009) discuss that there was a decline in the quality of 
loans
1
 issued in the pre-crisis period, a consequence of the low interest rate / high 
liquidity environment of the time.  Many non-prime loan assets were securitized into 
asset-backed securities (ABS) and then repackaged into collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).  As much as 50% of these asset-backed securities remained in the banking 
system, effectively undermining the credit risk transfer process and leaving banks 
exposed to the inevitable default from non-prime borrowers (Jaffee, et al., 2009).   
 Another excessive risk-taking activity was the regulatory arbitrage undertaken by 
financial institutions in the form of off-balance sheet financing.  The Bank Holding 
Company Act, as regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, requires that 
U.S. banks maintain a capital adequacy requirement of at least 4% Tier 1 equity capital  
                                                 
1
 Sub-prime mortgage loans received much of the media scrutiny surrounding the causes of the Financial 
Crisis.  “Covenant-lite” loans were the commercial equivalent to sub-prime mortgages and showed marked 
increase during the pre-Crisis period (Richardson, 2009).   
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to risk-weighted assets
2.  This requirement effectively limits banks’ credit risk exposure 
by reducing the amount of loans they can hold on their balance sheets.  However, in the 
pre-crisis period banks arbitraged around this requirement by establishing asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and special investment vehicles (SIVs) that enabled 
them to transfer loans off their balance sheets into shell companies in exchange for 
capital that they could further lend out to customers (see Acharya and Schnabl 2009).  
This increased bank leverage substantially while still meeting capital adequacy from a 
technical regulatory perspective.  However, these off-balance sheet vehicles contained 
recourse requirements that forced financial institutions to take back the loans in the event 
of excessive loan write-offs.  Since most of the loans transferred off-balance sheet were 
of poor quality, write-offs of these loans were inevitable and thus were transferred back 
to the financial institutions.  With these loans now on-balance sheet, financial 
institutions were in breach (risk of breach) of the minimum Tier 1 capital regulatory 
requirement which resulted in disastrous consequences.   
 As outlined in Acharya et al. (2009b), the effects of poor lending standards and 
excessive leverage began to negatively impact the financial sector during the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2009.  Ownit Mortgage Solutions and New Century Financial, two major 
lenders in non-prime loans, filed for bankruptcy in December 2006 and April 2007, 
respectively.  In June and July of 2007, Moody’s and S&P downgraded several billion 
dollars of securities backed by subprime loans and put several CDO tranches on review  
                                                 
2
 Total qualifying capital must be 8% of risk-weighted assets.  For details of the capital asset requirements 
see: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-2360.html#fdic6000appendixgtopart225sec3.  
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for a downgrade in credit rating.  In August 2007, American Home Mortgage Lending 
Corp. files for bankruptcy and BNP Paribas suspended redemption of commercial paper 
from three of its SIVs which caused money markets to freeze.  By mid-August of 2007, 
the volatility index which measures the degree of uncertainty in the capital markets grew 
to 3 times in February of the same year.  TED spreads, an indicator of banks’ willingness 
to lend, grew 4 times in first two weeks of August.  Another indicator of banks’ 
willingness to lend, the LIBOR-OIS spreads, grew 10 times wider over the summer of 
2007. The remainder of 2007 was marked with announcements of large asset write-
downs by major financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, Citibank, 
Merrill Lynch and UBS to name a few.   
As a result of the above events, credit rationing ensued among financial 
institutions which was in sharp contrast to the credit abundance period just 3 years prior.  
Credit rationing within the financial sector was so rampant that, in the midst of large 
investment bank failures, the U.S. Federal Government passed the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) on October 3
rd
, 2008 to stimulate credit markets and prevent financial 
collapse.  Additionally, the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds rate (FFR) to a 
target range between 0% and 0.25% as a means to reduce credit rationing.  While the 
events both preceding and during the Financial Crisis were extreme examples of how 
creditors’ risk tolerances vary over time, they do suggest that the role of disclosure in 
debt contracting can take on varying degrees of importance.  
Given that creditors have greater uncertainty over debt repayment during periods 
of credit rationing, they are likely to seek assurances through greater disclosure 
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frequency.  If creditors work directly with firms to obtain nonpublic information (e.g. 
through more frequent reporting of private financial information) then firms’ decisions 
to voluntarily disclose more information publicly during periods of credit rationing may 
not have any marginal effect on their cost of debt capital.  If, however, firms’ voluntary 
disclosures partially subsidize creditors’ cost of obtaining additional information (Lang 
and Lundholm 1993), then voluntary disclosures will likely matter more during periods 
of credit rationing.  I argue that firms’ voluntary disclosures are valued by creditors more 
when credit is rationed.  Or, stated formally: 
H1:  The effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital is greater 
during periods of credit rationing. 
     
2.4 The Influence of Firm Size During periods of Credit Rationing 
Firm size can influence whether firms are able to obtain financing during tighter 
credit market conditions.  Greenspan (2008) recalls that, during the credit rationing 
period of 1990-1991, “… small and midsize manufacturers and merchants all over 
America were finding it hard to get even routine business loans approved.” (p. 117).   
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Prior theoretical literature documents this phenomenon by demonstrating that smaller 
firms are denied credit during periods of credit rationing because they lack sufficient 
collateral to provide creditors with assurance of debt repayment (Holmstrom and Tirole 
1997; Tirole 2006)
3
.  However, these studies also demonstrate that smaller firms are 
more likely to obtain debt financing if they can improve monitoring between themselves 
and the lender.  If greater voluntary disclosure improves creditors’ ability to monitor 
borrowers, then voluntary disclosure will matter more to creditors of smaller firms when 
credit is rationed.  This conjecture is supported by the evidence found in prior literature 
that relatively large firms have more robust information environments than smaller firms 
(Collins et al. 1987; Lev and Penman 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Frankel and Li 
2004) and thus are not as likely to benefit from voluntary disclosure as smaller firms 
during periods of credit rationing.   
To determine whether creditors react more to voluntary disclosure of smaller 
borrowers than larger borrowers during periods of credit rationing, I test the following 
hypothesis: 
H2:  The effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital is greater 
for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing. 
 
  
                                                 
3
 See Appendix A for a derivation of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 General Models 
 To test whether credit market conditions alter the effect of voluntary disclosure 
on firms’ cost of debt capital, I use the following levels-model: 
Cost of debt capital = f(voluntary disclosure, ∆credit market conditions,  
 firm controls)                                                    (1) 
 
While prior studies rely on levels-model tests, changes-models are stronger tests in that 
they are less subject to omitted variables bias (Woolridge 2000, p. 422).  Thus, I also use 
the following model in this study: 
∆Cost of debt capital = f(∆voluntary disclosure, ∆credit market conditions,  
∆firm controls)          (2) 
 
3.2 Cost of Debt Capital 
To estimate Equations (1) and (2), I use credit ratings as one of my measures of 
firms’ cost of debt capital.  Prior research finds that credit ratings are associated with 
credit risk (e.g. Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992) and encompass both 
pricing (e.g. interest charges) and non-pricing (e.g. debt covenant restrictiveness) 
attributes of firms’ cost of debt capital (e.g. Holthausen and Leftwich 1986; Altman 
1992).  Data on firms’ S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating is obtained from 
Compustat (variable “splticrm” in the ADSPRATE dataset).  Credit ratings are  
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converted into numeric scores where higher scores (i.e. high credit ratings) represent 
lower cost of debt capital (see Table 1).  Scoring for RATINGS1 follows the 
methodology used by Ahmed et al. (2002) where individual ratings are assigned a 
separate score.  Scoring for RATINGS2 and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), where major 
categories (e.g. AAA, AA, A, etc.) are assigned a single score.  Credit ratings are also 
delineated between investment- and speculative-grade where credit ratings of BBB- and 
higher are deemed investment grade and those lower than BBB- are deemed speculative 
grade (see Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Frost 2007).  Variable RATINGS3 equals 1 for 
firms win an investment-grade credit rating, and zero otherwise.  I include this measure 
because prior literature suggests that creditors are more sensitive to disclosure policies of 
firms that are rated just above or below the investment-/speculative-grade threshold (e.g. 
Ayers et al. 2010).  This suggests that the effect of changes in voluntary disclosure may 
be stronger for firms that move into / out of investment-grade ratings. 
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TABLE 1 
       Credit Rating Scores 
       Credit Rating 
 
RATINGS1 
 
RATINGS2 
 
RATINGS3 
AAA 
 
21 
 
7 
 
1 
AA+ 
 
20 
 
6 
 
1 
AA 
 
19 
 
6 
 
1 
AA- 
 
18 
 
6 
 
1 
A+ 
 
17 
 
5 
 
1 
A 
 
16 
 
5 
 
1 
A- 
 
15 
 
5 
 
1 
BBB+ 
 
14 
 
4 
 
1 
BBB 
 
13 
 
4 
 
1 
BBB- 
 
12 
 
4 
 
1 
BB+ 
 
11 
 
3 
 
0 
BB 
 
10 
 
3 
 
0 
BB- 
 
9 
 
3 
 
0 
B+ 
 
8 
 
2 
 
0 
B 
 
7 
 
2 
 
0 
B- 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
CCC+ 
 
5 
 
1 
 
0 
CCC 
 
4 
 
1 
 
0 
CCC- 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
CC 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
C 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
    
     Numeric scoring for RATINGS1 follows Ahmed et a. (2002), and numeric scoring for RATINGS2 and 
RATINGS3 follows Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006).  Lower scores represent lower credit ratings and higher 
credit risk.   
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For my changes-model, ∆RATINGS1, ∆RATINGS2, and ∆RATINGS3 represent 
the change in credit score from period t to period t+1 where positive (negative) changes 
represent a credit rating upgrade (downgrade), and going from negative changes in credit 
rating score to positive changes in credit rating score represents a general improvement 
in firms’ credit ratings and a likely decrease their cost of debt capital.   
My second measure of firms’ cost of debt capital is firms’ interest rate INTRATE 
is calculated as interest and related expense (variable “xint” in the Compustat FUNDA 
dataset) in period t+1divided by average total debt from the end of period t to the end of 
period t+1 (variables “dlc” plus “dltt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) multiplied by 
100.  My measure follows that of Francis et al. (2005) and Pittman and Fortin (2004).  
Pittman and Fortin (2004) suggest trimming this variable to eliminate outliers.  As such, 
I restrict my levels-model measure of INTRATE to between zero and 30%, and my 
changes-model measure of ∆INTRATE to between -30% and 30%.  These cut-off levels 
were chosen to be consistent with Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Francis et al. (2005).   
The discrete categories of credit ratings are intended to measure credit risk which 
is a latent, continuous variable.  The ranked levels of credit ratings differentiate between 
levels of credit risk, but I cannot assume uniform differences in credit risk between the 
levels of credit ratings or the scoring assigned to RATINGS1, RATINGS2, and 
RATINGS3 (see Ahmed et al. 2002; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Ayers et al. 2010).  
Likewise, for my changes-models, ∆RATINGS1, ∆RATINGS2, and ∆RATINGS3 identify 
changes in credit risk which is also a latent, continuous variable and thus represents 
increased / decreased credit risk.  I cannot assume uniform differences between changes 
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in these credit rating scores.  Thus, I estimate Equations (1) and (2) using ordinal logistic 
regression which treats levels and changes in credit rating scores as discrete.  For 
Equations (1) and (2) which use INTRATE and ∆INTRATE as the dependent variable, 
respectively, I use ordinary least squares regression. 
3.3 Voluntary Disclosure 
My first measure of voluntary disclosure is earnings conference call disclosure 
frequency (CC#), which is calculated as the number of earnings conference call 
disclosures held during period t.  Conference call data was obtained from BestCalls.com, 
which has since been acquired by NASDAQ.  Changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) are calculated as the difference between the number of earnings 
conference calls in period t less the number of earnings conference calls in period t-1.  
Conference calls provide incremental information to required disclosures (Lang 1998), 
and prior literature demonstrates that more frequent conference calls reduce the 
information asymmetry component of firms’ cost of capital (Tasker 1998; Frankel et al. 
1999; Bushee et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2004).  If creditors find greater conference call 
disclosure frequency useful in debt contracting, then I expect greater frequency in 
conference call disclosure frequency to result in a subsequent higher credit rating and a 
lower interest rate.  Likewise, I expect positive changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency to result in a subsequent improvement in credit rating and reduction in interest 
rate.  Furthermore, I expect these effects will be greater when credit is rationed 
suggesting that conference call disclosure is more important during periods of 
constrained credit.  Additionally, I expect these effects will be greater for smaller firms 
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than larger firms during periods of credit rationing suggesting that smaller firms benefit 
more from greater conference call disclosure when credit is constrained.   
My second measure of voluntary disclosure is earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (CIG#), which is measured as the number of earnings guidance forecasts 
issued during period t.  Earnings guidance data was obtained from First Call, which was 
decommissioned by Wharton Research Data Services in February of 2012.  Changes in 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency (∆CIG#) are calculated as the difference 
between the number of earnings guidance forecasts issued in period t less the number of 
earnings guidance forecasts issued in period t-1.  Prior literature finds that managers who 
release earnings guidance reduce the information asymmetry component of firms’ cost 
of capital (Coller and Yohn 1997; Lang and Lundholm 2000).  Additionally, earnings 
guidance has been shown to mitigate litigation, reputational, and capital costs associated 
with future bad news (Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Soffer et al. 2000).  If 
creditors find greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency useful in debt contracting, 
then then I expect greater frequency in earnings guidance disclosure frequency to result 
in a subsequent higher credit rating and a lower interest rate.  Likewise, I expect positive 
changes in earnings guidance disclosure frequency to result in a subsequent 
improvement in credit rating and reduction in interest rate.  Furthermore, I expect these 
effects will be greater when credit is rationed suggesting that earnings guidance 
disclosure is more important during periods of constrained credit.  Additionally, I expect 
these effects will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit 
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rationing suggesting that smaller firms benefit more from greater earnings guidance 
disclosure when credit is constrained.   
3.4 Credit Market Conditions 
 I employ two measures of credit market conditions in my analyses.  The first 
measure draws from the results of the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey.  Schreft and Owens (1991), Berger and Udell (2004), and Lown and Morgan 
(2002 and 2006) find the results of the Senior Loan Officer Survey reflect credit market 
sentiment (e.g. optimism and pessimism) and follow a pattern of credit standard 
tightening before economic recessions and credit standard loosening before economic 
expansion.  The survey is conducted approximately 4 times per year and consists of over 
100 questions on creditor sentiment and lending policy changes.  My first credit market 
condition variable, SLOOS, measures the net percentage of banks tightening commercial 
and industrial (C&I) lending standards.  The figure reported by the Federal Reserve is 
calculated as the number of banks tightening their C&I lending standards less the 
number of banks easing their C&I lending standards, divided by the number of banks 
responding.  I calculate the average of this reported figure over the 4 quarterly surveys to 
derive an annual net percentage of C&I credit standard tightening.  The time-series trend 
in this figure is shown in Table 2.   
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TABLE 2 
       Time-series Measures of Credit Market Conditions 
       Year 
 
SLOOS ∆SLOOS 
 
KCFSI ∆KCFSI 
1994 
 
(12.4) 
  
            (0.888) 
 1995 
 
(5.6) 6.8  
 
            (0.799)               0.089  
1996 
 
(1.4) 4.3  
 
            (0.857)             (0.058) 
1997 
 
(6.3) (5.0) 
 
            (0.608)               0.248  
1998 
 
7.8  14.1  
 
              0.093                0.701  
1999 
 
8.0  0.2  
 
              0.377                0.284  
2000 
 
28.3  20.3  
 
              0.666                0.289  
2001 
 
50.5  22.2  
 
              0.535              (0.131) 
2002 
 
28.0  (22.5) 
 
              0.424              (0.111) 
2003 
 
8.6  (19.4) 
 
            (0.178)             (0.602) 
2004 
 
(20.6) (29.2) 
 
            (0.618)             (0.440) 
2005 
 
(18.3) 2.3  
 
            (0.649)             (0.032) 
2006 
 
(8.0) 10.3  
 
            (0.685)             (0.036) 
2007 
 
5.8  13.7  
 
            (0.133)               0.552  
2008 
 
57.2  51.5  
 
              2.325                2.458  
2009 
 
37.3  (19.9) 
 
              1.933              (0.393) 
2010 
 
(8.0) (45.3) 
 
              0.025              (1.908) 
    
     Yearly measures of SLOOS and KCFSI.  Changes in credit market conditions (∆SLOOS and ∆KCFSI) are 
calculated as the value in the current period less the value in the prior period, where positive (negative) changes 
represent increases (decreases) over the prior year's value.  Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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While it is reasonable to view positive levels of net standard tightening as 
representing a periods of credit rationing, a declining but positive level of net standard 
tightening could reasonably be interpreted as a period of credit abundance of credit  
standard loosening.  As such, the direction of change in SLOOS is deemed to identify 
credit market sentiment in this study where positive (negative) changes in SLOOS 
represent periods of credit rationing (abundance) and ∆SLOOS is used in both my levels- 
and changes-models.   
My second measure of credit market conditions is an index derived from several 
individual credit rationing indicators.  Sabry and Okongwu (2009) examine interest rate 
spreads both before and during the Credit Crisis of 2007-2009 and find sharp increases 
in the 2-Year Swap spread and TED spread in the month of August 2007, the beginning 
of the financial crisis (Acharya et al. 2009b; Brunnermeier 2009), followed by a period 
of high variation in the spreads and even further increases in September 2008.  The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City compiles data on these and other credit market 
condition factors to create a composite index of credit market stress called the financial 
stress index.  I use the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) as a measure of 
credit market conditions, where positive (negative) changes in the index (∆KCFSI) 
indicate periods of credit rationing (abundance).  Trends in the KCFSI are also shown in 
Table 2.   
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3.5 Control Variables  
 From Compustat I include numerous firm characteristics as control variables 
from prior literature that are associated with firms’ cost of debt capital.  Firm leverage 
(DTA) is the ratio of total debt to total assets at the end of period t.  Firms with greater 
leverage are at greater risk of default and incur higher costs of debt capital (Kaplan and 
Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ogden 1987; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  Firm 
size (LNSIZE) is measured by taking the natural log of 1 plus total assets at the end of 
period t.  Large firms have greater resources available to service their debt and thus incur 
lower debt capital charges (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ogden 
1987; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  Firm profitability (ROA) is the ratio of income 
before extraordinary items during period t to average total assets over the period t-1 to t.  
More profitable firms are better able to service their debt obligations and, as such, incur 
lower cost of debt capital (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ogden 
1987; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  Interest coverage (COV) is the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation to interest costs for period t.  Firms that are better able to 
meet debt service charges are at less risk of default and are charged a smaller risk 
premium (Kaplan and Urwitz 1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006).  Capital intensity (CAP) is the ratio of gross property plant and equipment for 
period t divided by average total assets from period t-1 to period t.  While prior literature 
finds that higher levels of CAP result in lower levels in firms’ cost of debt capital 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006), it is unclear whether higher levels or an increase in CAP 
will results in a decrease in firms’ cost of debt capital since less cash will be available to 
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service debt (see Ayers et al. 2010).  As such I make no prediction of the direction of 
influence for CAP.  Firms that experience a loss likely charged a higher cost of debt due 
to the greater risk of default (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Ayers et al. 2010).  I create 
an indicator variable for loss firms (LOSS) equals 1 if income before extraordinary items 
is less than or equal to zero for period t.  Firms with subordinated debt are considered to 
more risky due to the differential claims to assets by debt providers (Kaplan and Urwitz 
1979; Ziebart and Reiter 1992; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006).  I include an indicator 
variable (SUB) equal to 1 if a firm has subordinated debt at the end of period t.  Changes 
in all control variables (∆CONTROLS) are calculated as the difference between their 
measures in period t less their measures in period t-1.  All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. 
I also control for industry fixed effects using Fama and French’s (1997) 17 
industry classifications as firm membership in a particular industry will likely influence 
debt capital structure.  I remove firms belonging to regulated utility and financial 
industries as these firms are highly leveraged and factors influencing their cost of debt 
capital are not likely to be consistent with firms in unregulated industries (Sengupta 
1998; Pittman and Fortin 2004; Francis et al. 2005).  I also control for time-series effects 
by including an indicator variable for the year of observation t.  
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
This section discusses the derivation of the samples used in my analyses.  
Because the years of coverage for my voluntary disclosure variables do not coincide, 
estimating a model that includes both conference call and earnings guidance disclosure 
data could potentially unnecessarily eliminate sample observations.  Similarly, because I 
have more data on interest rates than data on credit ratings, requiring panel data to have 
both credit ratings and interest rates for each observation would potentially unnecessarily 
eliminate sample data.  Thus, rather than construct a single sample that has both of my 
voluntary disclosure variables and both of my dependent variables I construct separate 
samples.   
Data on credit ratings from Compustat consisted of 43,469 firm-year 
observations.  After eliminating observations in regulated industries and observations  
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with missing data on control variables and disclosure variables, my sample sizes 
consisted of 7,564 (6,866) firm-year observations for my levels-model testing of the 
effects of conference call (earnings guidance) on credit ratings (see Panels A and B in 
Table 3).  Using the same elimination procedure, my sample sizes consisted of 6,647 
(6,079) firm-year observations for my changes-model testing of the effects of changes in 
conference call (earnings guidance) on changes in credit ratings (see Panels C and D in 
Table 3).    
Data on interest rates from Compustat consisted of 141,359 firm-year 
observations.  After  eliminating observations in regulated industries and observations 
with missing data on control variables and disclosure variables, my sample sizes 
consisted of 18,665 (14,618) firm-year observations for my levels-model testing of the 
effects of conference call (earnings guidance) on interest rates (see Panels E and F in 
Table 3).  Using the same elimination procedure, my sample sizes consisted of 15,042 
(11,486) firm-year observations for my changes-model testing of the effects of changes 
in conference call (earnings guidance) on changes in credit ratings (see Panels C and D 
in Table 3).    
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TABLE 3 
    Sample Details 
    
Panel A: Sample Selection for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings for period 
 
              43,469  
 
Less: unavailable data for control variables             (17,272) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (2,561) 
 
Less: unavailable conference call data 
 
            (15,982) 
Total conference call observations for credit ratings levels-model testing                7,654  
    
Panel B: Sample Selection for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings for period 
 
              43,469  
 
Less: unavailable data for control variables             (17,272) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (2,561) 
 
Less: unavailable earnings guidance data             (16,770) 
Total earnings guidance observations for credit ratings levels-model testing                6,866  
    
Panel C :Sample Selection for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings for period 
 
              43,469  
 
Less: unavailable data for year-over-year control variables             (18,009) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (2,450) 
 
Less: unavailable year-over-year conference call data             (16,363) 
Total conference call observations for credit ratings changes-model testing                6,647  
    
Panel D: Sample Selection for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings for period 
 
              43,469  
 
Less: unavailable data for year-over-year control variables             (18,009) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (2,450) 
 
Less: unavailable year-over-year earnings guidance data             (16,931) 
Total earnings guidance observations for credit ratings changes-model testing                6,079  
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
    
Panel E: Sample Selection for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year interest rates for period 
 
            141,359  
 
Less: unavailable data for control variables             (48,565) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (7,782) 
 
Less: unavailable conference call data 
 
            (66,347) 
Total conference call observations for interest rates levels-model testing               18,665  
   
  
Panel F: Sample Selection for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year interest rates 
 
            141,359  
 
Less: unavailable data for control variables             (48,565) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (7,782) 
 
Less: unavailable earnings guidance data             (70,394) 
Total earnings guidance observations for interest rates levels-model testing               14,618  
    
Panel G: Sample Selection for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings 
 
            141,359  
 
Less: unavailable data for year-over-year control variables             (57,868) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (6,915) 
 
Less: unavailable conference call data 
 
            (61,534) 
Total conference call observations for interest rates changes-model testing               15,042  
    
Panel H: Sample Selection for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
   
Number of 
Observations 
Total firm-year credit ratings 
 
            141,359  
 
Less: unavailable data for year-over-year control variables             (57,868) 
 
Less: observations of firms in regulated industries               (6,915) 
 
Less: unavailable earnings guidance data (65,090) 
Total earnings guidance observations for interest rates changes-model testing               11,486  
    
  
Panels A and B (C and D) detail the selection process for the levels- (changes-)model samples used in testing 
the effects of conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms' credit ratings.  Panels E 
and F (G and H) detail the selection process for levels- (changes-)model samples used in testing the effects of 
conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms' interest rates.   
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for my separate levels- and changes-model samples are 
provided in Table 4.  Individual Panels present correlation statistics for separate samples 
used in the study (see Table 3 for a description of how the separate samples are 
determined).Values of both levels and changes in my control variables and my voluntary 
disclosure variables are winzorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to account for outliers.   
 The mean (median) level of RATINGS1 for my levels-model testing of 
conference call disclosure frequency in Table 4, Panel A is 11.21 (11.00) which 
corresponds to a BB+ credit rating per my scoring methodology in Table 1.  The mean 
(median) level of RATINGS1 for my levels-model testing of earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency in Table 4, Panel B is 11.99 (12.00) which corresponds to a BBB- 
credit rating per my scoring methodology in Table 1.  Panels C and D show mean and 
median values of approximately zero for ∆RATINGS1 in both my conference call and 
earnings guidance samples which indicates that, on average, credit ratings change very 
little year-over-year.   
 The mean and median values for INTRATE are 7.55% and 6.87% for the 
conference call sample (Panel E) and 7.41% and 6.92% for the earnings guidance sample 
(Panel F).  Mean and median values for ∆INTRATE in Panels G and H are approximately 
zero for the conference call and earnings guidance samples indicating that, on average, 
interest rates change very little year-over-year. 
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TABLE 4 
  
            Descriptive Statistics 
  
            Panel A: Univariate Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency 
on Credit Ratings 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
RATINGS1 7,654 11.21 3.45 9.00 11.00 14.00 
 
RATINGS2  7,654  3.43  1.17  3.00  3.00  4.00 
 
RATINGS3  7,654  0.46  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC# 7,654 3.33 1.11 3.00 4.00 4.00 
 
CC# (smaller firm sample)  3,826  3.34  1.08  3.00  4.00  4.00 
 
CC# (larger firm sample)  3,828  3.33  1.13  3.00  4.00  4.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  10  4.94  24.36  -19.35  6.29  20.33 
 
∆KCFSI  10  0.22  0.86  -0.13  -0.03  0.29 
Control Variables             
 
DTA  7,654  0.34  0.20  0.20  0.31  0.44 
 
LNSIZE  7,654  8.10  1.40  7.08  7.93  9.02 
 
ROA  7,654  0.03  0.09  0.01  0.04  0.08 
 
COV  7,654  12.13  22.36  3.12  6.23  12.16 
 
CAP  7,654  0.60  0.39  0.28  0.53  0.87 
 
LOSS  7,654  0.21  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
SUB  7,654  0.22  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  
            Panel B: Univariate Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
RATINGS1 6,866 11.99 3.31 9.00 12.00 14.00 
 
RATINGS2  6,866  3.68  1.13  3.00  4.00  4.00 
 
RATINGS3  6,866  0.55  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIG# 6,866 5.27 4.07 2.00 4.00 8.00 
 
CIG# (smaller firm sample)  3,429  4.72  3.87  2.00  4.00  7.00 
 
CIG# (larger firm sample)  3,437  5.81  4.20  2.00  5.00  8.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  18  -0.57  22.33  -19.35  1.23  13.73 
 
∆KCFSI  18  0.02  0.82  -0.27  -0.05  0.28 
Control Variables             
 
DTA  6,866  0.31  0.17  0.20  0.29  0.41 
 
LNSIZE  6,866  8.08  1.32  7.13  7.98  8.96 
 
ROA  6,866  0.04  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.08 
 
COV  6,866  13.23  24.28  3.88  7.13  13.01 
 
CAP  6,866  0.53  0.34  0.26  0.45  0.74 
 
LOSS  6,866  0.16  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
SUB  6,866  0.19  0.39  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
  
            Panel C : Univariate Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
∆RATINGS1 6,647 -0.14 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
∆RATINGS2  6,647  -0.04  0.36  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆RATINGS3  6,647  -0.01  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆CC# 6,647 0.01 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
∆CC# (smaller firm sample)  3,322  0.02  1.22  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆CC# (larger firm sample)  3,325  0.00  1.18  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  9  5.47  25.77  -19.35  10.33  20.33 
 
∆KCFSI  9  0.22  0.91  -0.13  -0.04  0.29 
Control Variables             
 
∆DTA  6,647  0.00  0.09  -0.04  -0.01  0.03 
 
∆LNSIZE  6,647  0.08  0.23  -0.02  0.05  0.14 
 
∆ROA  6,647  -0.01  0.08  -0.02  0.00  0.02 
 
∆COV  6,647  -0.65  17.95  -1.11  0.27  1.78 
 
∆CAP  6,647  0.00  0.09  -0.02  0.01  0.04 
 
∆LOSS  6,647  0.01  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆SUB  6,647  -0.01  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  
            Panel D: Univariate Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
∆RATINGS1 6,079 -0.13 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
∆RATINGS2  6,079  -0.05  0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆RATINGS3  6,079  -0.01  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆CIG# 6,079 0.33 3.29 -1.00 0.00 2.00 
 
∆CIG# (smaller firm sample)  3,035  0.28  3.17  -1.00  0.00  2.00 
 
∆CIG# (larger firm sample)  3,044  0.38  3.40  -1.00  0.00  2.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  16  0.28  23.55  -19.61  3.25  13.90 
 
∆KCFSI  16  0.06  0.87  -0.26  -0.03  0.29 
Control Variables             
 
∆DTA  6,079  0.00  0.08  -0.04  -0.01  0.03 
 
∆LNSIZE  6,079  0.08  0.21  -0.02  0.05  0.14 
 
∆ROA  6,079  -0.01  0.07  -0.02  0.00  0.02 
 
∆COV  6,079  -0.96  19.04  -1.46  0.15  1.69 
 
∆CAP  6,079  0.00  0.07  -0.02  0.01  0.03 
 
∆LOSS  6,079  0.02  0.40  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆SUB  6,079  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
  
            Panel E: Univariate Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency 
on Interest Rates 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
INTRATE 18,665 7.55 4.28 5.12 6.87 8.95 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC# 18,665 3.19 1.21 2.00 4.00 4.00 
 
CC# (smaller firm sample)  9,330  3.08  1.26  2.00  4.00  4.00 
 
CC# (larger firm sample)  9,335  3.29  1.15  2.00  4.00  4.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  10  4.94  24.36  -19.35  6.29  20.33 
 
∆KCFSI  10  0.22  0.86  -0.13  -0.03  0.29 
Control Variables             
 
DTA  18,665  0.26  0.22  0.10  0.23  0.37 
 
LNSIZE  18,665  6.50  1.94  5.11  6.48  7.79 
 
ROA  18,665  -0.02  0.21  -0.03  0.04  0.08 
 
COV  18,665  20.59  172.61  2.13  6.40  16.39 
 
CAP  18,665  0.52  0.38  0.21  0.42  0.75 
 
LOSS  18,665  0.32  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00 
 
SUB  18,665  0.12  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  
            Panel F: Univariate Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
INTRATE 14,618 7.41 3.87 5.22 6.92 8.73 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIG# 14,618 4.34 3.68 1.00 3.00 6.00 
 
CIG# (smaller firm sample)  7,306  3.64  3.15  1.00  3.00  5.00 
 
CIG# (larger firm sample)  7,312  5.04  4.02  2.00  4.00  7.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  19  -1.38  21.99  -19.35  0.20  13.73 
 
∆KCFSI  19  0.00  0.81  -0.39  -0.06  0.28 
Control Variables             
 
DTA  14,618  0.25  0.18  0.11  0.23  0.35 
 
LNSIZE  14,618  6.66  1.79  5.42  6.61  7.86 
 
ROA  14,618  0.03  0.13  0.01  0.05  0.09 
 
COV  14,618  34.80  143.55  3.84  8.35  19.84 
 
CAP  14,618  0.48  0.33  0.22  0.40  0.68 
 
LOSS  14,618  0.22  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
SUB  14,618  0.11  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
  
            Panel G: Univariate Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
∆INTRATE 15,042 -0.17 4.47 -1.28 -0.12 0.89 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆CC# 15,042 0.05 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
∆CC# (smaller firm sample)  7,519  0.07  1.30  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆CC# (larger firm sample)  7,523  0.02  1.23  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  9  5.47  25.77  -19.35  10.33  20.33 
 
∆KCFSI  9  0.22  0.91  -0.13  -0.04  0.29 
Control Variables             
 
∆DTA  15,042  0.01  0.11  -0.04  0.00  0.04 
 
∆LNSIZE  15,042  0.08  0.28  -0.04  0.06  0.17 
 
∆ROA  15,042  0.00  0.14  -0.03  0.00  0.03 
 
∆COV  15,042  -1.35  134.83  -2.49  0.36  3.75 
 
∆CAP  15,042  0.01  0.10  -0.02  0.01  0.04 
 
∆LOSS  15,042  0.01  0.42  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆SUB  15,042  -0.01  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  
            Panel H: Univariate Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates 
  
            
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Q1 
 
Med 
 
Q2 
Dependent Variables 
            
 
∆INTRATE 11,486 -0.07 3.86 -1.07 -0.07 0.86 
Disclosure Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∆CIG# 11,486 0.35 3.06 -1.00 0.00 2.00 
 
∆CIG# (smaller firm sample)  5,739  0.31  2.83  -1.00  0.00  2.00 
 
∆CIG# (larger firm sample)  5,747  0.39  3.27  -1.00  0.00  2.00 
Credit Market Condition Variables             
 
∆SLOOS  17  0.16  22.80  -19.35  2.25  13.73 
 
∆KCFSI  17  0.04  0.85  -0.27  -0.04  0.28 
Control Variables             
 
∆DTA  11,486  0.00  0.09  -0.04  -0.01  0.03 
 
∆LNSIZE  11,486  0.09  0.24  -0.02  0.06  0.16 
 
∆ROA  11,486  -0.01  0.10  -0.03  0.00  0.02 
 
∆COV  11,486  -0.76  113.82  -2.75  0.17  2.97 
 
∆CAP  11,486  0.00  0.08  -0.02  0.01  0.04 
 
∆LOSS  11,486  0.03  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
∆SUB  11,486  0.00  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    
            Variables are described in Appendix B.  Changes in control variables and voluntary disclosure variables have been 
winzorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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4.3 Correlation Statistics 
Table 5 presents correlation statistics for all variables used in my levels- and 
changes-models.  Individual Panels present correlation statistics for separate samples 
used in the study (see Table 3 for a description of how the separate samples are 
determined).     
In Panels A through D, both levels and changes in conference call and earnings 
guidance disclosure frequency are positively and significantly correlated (p≤0.10) with 
RATINGS1 suggesting that higher levels and positive changes in both conference call 
and earnings guidance disclosure frequency results in higher and improved credit ratings 
and likely a lower cost of debt capital.  In Panels E through H, both levels and changes 
in conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency are negatively and 
significantly correlated (p≤0.10) with INTRATE suggesting that higher levels and 
positive changes in both conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
results in lower and reduced interest rate and likely a lower cost of debt capital.   
  
  
 
TABLE 5 
               Correlations 
               Panel A: Correlation Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings 
               Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) RATINGS1 
 
0.97 0.84 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.50 0.63 0.49 0.34 -0.01 -0.45 -0.28 
(2) RATINGS2 0.97 
 
0.84 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.49 0.62 0.47 0.33 -0.02 -0.43 -0.27 
(3) RATINGS3 0.87 0.89 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.43 0.54 0.35 0.26 0.02 -0.34 -0.33 
(4) CC# 0.03 0.03 0.01 
 
-0.45 -0.50 -0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 
(5) ∆SLOOS -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.41 
 
0.83 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.03 
(6) ∆KCFSI -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.41 0.67 
 
0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.05 
(7) DTA -0.50 -0.49 -0.44 -0.09 0.05 0.01 
 
-0.29 -0.36 -0.41 0.14 0.32 0.33 
(8) LNSIZE 0.62 0.60 0.55 -0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.29 
 
0.19 0.17 0.02 -0.17 -0.19 
(9) ROA 0.53 0.51 0.41 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.40 0.18 
 
0.34 -0.02 -0.70 -0.10 
(10) COV 0.67 0.65 0.55 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.70 0.31 0.74 
 
-0.06 -0.21 -0.17 
(11) CAP 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
 
0.05 -0.04 
(12) LOSS -0.46 -0.44 -0.34 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.28 -0.16 -0.71 -0.52 0.04 
 
0.08 
(13) SUB -0.29 -0.29 -0.33 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.34 -0.20 -0.17 -0.32 -0.06 0.08 
 
               Panel B: Correlation Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings 
               Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) RATINGS1 
 
0.97 0.82 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.42 0.62 0.44 0.28 0.08 -0.36 -0.30 
(2) RATINGS2 0.97 
 
0.83 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.42 0.60 0.43 0.27 0.06 -0.35 -0.29 
(3) RATINGS3 0.86 0.89 
 
0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.39 0.52 0.32 0.21 0.10 -0.28 -0.35 
(4) CIG# 0.16 0.16 0.13 
 
-0.10 -0.07 -0.14 0.20 0.15 0.12 -0.08 -0.15 -0.09 
(5) ∆SLOOS -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 
 
0.85 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
(6) ∆KCFSI 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.17 0.71 
 
0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 
(7) DTA -0.41 -0.40 -0.37 -0.14 0.08 0.06 
 
-0.25 -0.29 -0.42 0.09 0.22 0.33 
(8) LNSIZE 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.23 -0.02 -0.02 -0.23 
 
0.15 0.12 0.02 -0.14 -0.16 
(9) ROA 0.48 0.46 0.37 0.20 -0.02 0.03 -0.35 0.14 
 
0.31 -0.02 -0.67 -0.12 
(10) COV 0.61 0.58 0.51 0.24 -0.06 -0.02 -0.69 0.26 0.71 
 
-0.05 -0.17 -0.16 
(11) CAP 0.12 0.11 0.13 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.02 
 
0.04 -0.07 
(12) LOSS -0.36 -0.35 -0.28 -0.16 0.04 0.00 0.19 -0.13 -0.63 -0.44 0.03 
 
0.07 
(13) SUB -0.32 -0.32 -0.35 -0.10 0.02 0.00 0.33 -0.18 -0.20 -0.35 -0.09 0.07 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
               Panel C : Correlation Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings 
               Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) ∆RATINGS1 
 
0.73 0.41 0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.23 0.15 0.25 0.06 -0.11 -0.19 0.00 
(2) ∆RATINGS2 0.66 
 
0.53 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 0.13 0.19 0.05 -0.10 -0.14 0.01 
(3) ∆RATINGS3 0.35 0.52 
 
0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 
(4) ∆CC# 0.04 0.05 0.02 
 
-0.33 -0.57 -0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 
(5) ∆SLOOS -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.21 
 
0.85 0.16 -0.04 -0.18 -0.07 0.09 0.14 0.00 
(6) ∆KCFSI -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.39 0.71 
 
0.16 -0.09 -0.16 -0.04 0.12 0.12 0.00 
(7) ∆DTA -0.25 -0.18 -0.08 -0.09 0.19 0.17 
 
0.09 -0.33 -0.24 0.07 0.17 0.05 
(8) ∆LNSIZE 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 
 
0.13 -0.10 -0.53 -0.07 0.08 
(9) ∆ROA 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.20 -0.11 -0.35 0.09 
 
0.17 -0.22 -0.52 -0.01 
(10) ∆COV 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.00 -0.17 -0.12 -0.36 0.07 0.49 
 
0.01 -0.09 -0.02 
(11) ∆CAP -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.57 -0.13 -0.05 
 
0.12 -0.03 
(12) ∆LOSS -0.19 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.09 0.20 -0.10 -0.55 -0.25 0.11 
 
0.00 
(13) ∆SUB 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 
 
               Panel D: Correlation Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Earnings Guidance Frequency on Credit Ratings 
               Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) ∆RATINGS1 
 
0.74 0.47 0.03 -0.13 -0.11 -0.21 0.13 0.24 0.05 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 
(2) ∆RATINGS2 0.65 
 
0.60 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.16 0.11 0.17 0.04 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 
(3) ∆RATINGS3 0.39 0.59 
 
0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 
(4) ∆CIG# 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 
(5) ∆SLOOS -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 0.05 
 
0.86 0.15 0.00 -0.16 -0.07 0.06 0.12 0.05 
(6) ∆KCFSI -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.72 
 
0.14 -0.02 -0.14 -0.05 0.08 0.10 0.04 
(7) ∆DTA -0.23 -0.16 -0.09 -0.02 0.18 0.19 
 
0.20 -0.30 -0.22 -0.03 0.17 0.08 
(8) ∆LNSIZE 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.13 
 
0.12 -0.06 -0.54 -0.08 0.06 
(9) ∆ROA 0.26 0.18 0.10 0.05 -0.18 -0.09 -0.32 0.06 
 
0.18 -0.20 -0.58 -0.02 
(10) ∆COV 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.04 -0.17 -0.14 -0.36 0.04 0.49 
 
-0.02 -0.10 -0.02 
(11) ∆CAP -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.57 -0.10 -0.05 
 
0.12 -0.02 
(12) ∆LOSS -0.20 -0.14 -0.06 -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.20 -0.12 -0.56 -0.26 0.12 
 
0.03 
(13) ∆SUB -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 
  3
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
             Panel E: Correlation Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates 
             Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) INTRATE 
 
-0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -0.06 0.00 0.18 0.07 
(2) CC# -0.08 
 
-0.38 -0.43 -0.04 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.02 -0.10 0.02 
(3) ∆SLOOS 0.02 -0.35 
 
0.82 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 
(4) ∆KCFSI 0.04 -0.38 0.65 
 
0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
(5) DTA 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 
 
0.17 -0.09 -0.11 0.20 0.09 0.31 
(6) LNSIZE -0.17 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.28 
 
0.38 0.07 0.16 -0.33 0.11 
(7) ROA -0.19 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.13 0.30 
 
0.33 0.09 -0.66 0.04 
(8) COV -0.27 0.11 -0.04 0.01 -0.37 0.24 0.77 
 
0.01 -0.25 -0.03 
(9) CAP 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.23 0.19 0.09 0.08 
 
-0.07 0.02 
(10) LOSS 0.17 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.34 -0.81 -0.66 -0.10 
 
0.00 
(11) SUB 0.15 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.31 0.12 -0.06 -0.16 0.01 0.00 
 
             Panel F: Correlation Statistics for Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates 
             Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) INTRATE 
 
-0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 -0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.14 0.09 
(2) CIG# -0.21 
 
-0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.32 0.15 0.04 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 
(3) ∆SLOOS 0.05 -0.06 
 
0.80 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 
(4) ∆KCFSI 0.11 -0.13 0.64 
 
0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
(5) DTA 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.06 
 
0.19 -0.10 -0.25 0.15 0.06 0.33 
(6) LNSIZE -0.19 0.34 0.01 -0.01 0.25 
 
0.23 -0.05 0.10 -0.23 0.08 
(7) ROA -0.17 0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.20 0.14 
 
0.25 0.04 -0.69 -0.03 
(8) COV -0.27 0.19 -0.06 -0.02 -0.55 0.06 0.70 
 
-0.06 -0.16 -0.07 
(9) CAP 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.01 
 
-0.03 -0.03 
(10) LOSS 0.14 -0.17 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.23 -0.72 -0.52 -0.05 
 
0.03 
(11) SUB 0.16 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.31 0.09 -0.12 -0.26 -0.04 0.03 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
             Panel G: Correlation Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates 
             Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) ∆INTRATE 
 
-0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
(2) ∆CC# -0.02 
 
-0.30 -0.54 -0.06 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 
(3) ∆SLOOS -0.12 -0.19 
 
0.85 0.11 -0.03 -0.14 -0.04 0.09 0.11 -0.01 
(4) ∆KCFSI -0.04 -0.37 0.71 
 
0.11 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.10 0.10 -0.01 
(5) ∆DTA -0.02 -0.08 0.14 0.12 
 
0.01 -0.24 -0.05 0.10 0.13 0.06 
(6) ∆LNSIZE -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 
 
0.22 0.05 -0.54 -0.08 0.05 
(7) ∆ROA -0.02 0.05 -0.17 -0.11 -0.28 0.15 
 
0.13 -0.24 -0.43 0.00 
(8) ∆COV 0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.24 0.07 0.45 
 
-0.04 -0.09 -0.01 
(9) ∆CAP 0.00 -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 -0.58 -0.19 -0.09 
 
0.12 -0.02 
(10) ∆LOSS 0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.08 0.17 -0.11 -0.54 -0.28 0.13 
 
0.01 
(11) ∆SUB 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 
             Panel H: Correlation Statistics for Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates 
             Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) ∆INTRATE 
 
-0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
(2) ∆CIG# -0.04 
 
0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 
(3) ∆SLOOS -0.12 0.06 
 
0.82 0.13 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 0.06 0.11 0.01 
(4) ∆KCFSI -0.03 -0.01 0.66 
 
0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.00 
(5) ∆DTA -0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.17 
 
0.17 -0.25 -0.13 -0.03 0.16 0.08 
(6) ∆LNSIZE -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.13 
 
0.16 0.01 -0.57 -0.09 0.04 
(7) ∆ROA -0.03 0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.30 0.11 
 
0.15 -0.23 -0.53 -0.02 
(8) ∆COV 0.04 0.04 -0.14 -0.13 -0.33 0.06 0.48 
 
-0.04 -0.09 0.00 
(9) ∆CAP 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.58 -0.16 -0.08 
 
0.14 -0.01 
(10) ∆LOSS 0.03 -0.05 0.11 0.08 0.19 -0.13 -0.57 -0.29 0.14 
 
0.03 
(11) ∆SUB 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 
     
           Pearson (Spearman) correlations are above (below) the diagonal.  Bolded coefficients are significant at p < 0.10.  Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Analysis of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Credit Ratings Across Credit 
Market Conditions 
Where levels and changes in RATINGS1, RATINGS2, and RATINGS3 are used as 
the dependent variable, Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using ordinal logistic 
regression.  For my levels-model, positive (negative) coefficients are interpreted as an 
increase (decrease) in the odds of a higher credit rating.  For my changes-model, positive 
(negative) coefficients are interpreted as an increase (decrease) in the odds of a credit 
rating improvement.  All models include year and industry fixed effects, and estimates 
are based on Roger’s (1993) corrected standard errors clustered by firm.  Coefficients 
are reported in log-odds format, and the percent change in the odds ratio is also reported 
for the coefficients of the main and interaction effects of my voluntary disclosure 
variables. Results from levels-model testing of the effects of voluntary disclosure on 
credit ratings across credit market conditions are shown in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
Results from changes-model testing of the effects of voluntary disclosure on credit 
ratings across credit market conditions are shown in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.   
  
8
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5.1.1 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 6, Panel A examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that greater conference call disclosure frequency 
will be associated with higher credit rating scores, and that this effect will be greater 
during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CC# are positive 
but insignificant across all models.  The coefficients for the interaction term 
CC#×∆SLOOS indicate whether the effect of conference call disclosure frequency on 
firms’ credit rating scores varies with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  
However, the coefficients for all interaction terms are insignificant across all models and 
provide no support for H1. 
Table 6, Panel B examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that greater conference call disclosure 
frequency will be associated with higher credit rating scores, and that this effect will be 
greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CC# are 
positive but insignificant across all models.  The coefficients for the interaction term 
CC#×∆KCFSI indicate whether the effect of conference call disclosure frequency on 
firms’ credit rating scores varies with changes in the financial stress index.  However, 
the coefficients for all interaction terms are insignificant across all models and provide 
no support for H1. 
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TABLE 6 
            
Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions 
            
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
    
(1) 
RATINGS1  
(2) 
RATINGS2  
(3) 
RATINGS3 
Variable  
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
CC# 
 
+ 
 
0.028*** 3.1% 
 
0.038*** 4.3% 
 
0.042*** 4.8% 
    
(0.79)*** 
  
(1.00)*** 
  
(0.71)*** 
 
CC# × ∆SLOOS 
 
+ 
 
-0.000*** -0.0% 
 
-0.001*** -0.1% 
 
-0.001*** -0.1% 
    
(-0.11) *** 
  
(-0.44)*** 
  
(-0.25)*** 
 
DTA 
 
− 
 
-3.190*** 
  
-3.617*** 
  
-5.363*** 
 
    
(-11.19)*** 
  
(-11.70)*** 
  
(-9.83)*** 
 
LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.055*** 
  
1.079*** 
  
1.266*** 
 
    
(23.42)*** 
  
(22.88)*** 
  
(18.66)*** 
 
ROA 
 
+ 
 
7.973*** 
  
8.679*** 
  
9.409*** 
 
    
(13.18)*** 
  
(11.85)*** 
  
(6.82)*** 
 
COV 
 
+ 
 
0.009*** 
  
0.007*** 
  
-0.001*** 
 
    
(2.92)*** 
  
(2.41)*** 
  
(-0.32)*** 
 
CAP 
 
? 
 
0.539*** 
  
0.516*** 
  
0.841*** 
 
    
(4.16)*** 
  
(3.77)*** 
  
(3.75)*** 
 
LOSS 
 
− 
 
-1.199*** 
  
-1.166*** 
  
-1.251*** 
 
    
(-11.39)*** 
  
(-10.04)*** 
  
(-6.79)*** 
 
SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.567*** 
  
-0.605*** 
  
-1.592*** 
 
    
(-6.21)*** 
  
(-6.03)*** 
  
(-9.38)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
7,654 ii 
  
7,654 ii 
  
7,654 ii 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.21*** 
  
0.32*** 
  
0.49*** 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
    
(1) 
RATINGS1  
(2) 
RATINGS2  
(3) 
RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
CC# 
 
+ 
 
0.024*** 2.7% 
 
0.034*** 3.8% 
 
0.040*** 4.5% 
    
(0.71)*** 
  
(0.91)*** 
  
(0.70)*** 
 
CC# × ∆KCFSI 
 
+ 
 
0.045*** 5.1% 
 
0.024*** 2.7% 
 
-0.014*** -1.5% 
    
(0.97)*** 
  
(0.46)*** 
  
(-0.16)*** 
 
DTA 
 
− 
 
-3.192*** 
  
-3.618*** 
  
-5.363*** 
 
    
(-11.20)*** 
  
(-11.70)*** 
  
(-9.83)*** 
 
LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.055*** 
  
1.079*** 
  
1.266*** 
 
    
(23.41)*** 
  
(22.87)*** 
  
(18.65)*** 
 
ROA 
 
+ 
 
7.973*** 
  
8.678*** 
  
9.406*** 
 
    
(13.17)*** 
  
(11.84)*** 
  
(6.81)*** 
 
COV 
 
+ 
 
0.009*** 
  
0.007*** 
  
-0.001*** 
 
    
(2.91)*** 
  
(2.41)*** 
  
(-0.32)*** 
 
CAP 
 
? 
 
0.540*** 
  
0.517*** 
  
0.841*** 
 
    
(4.17)*** 
  
(3.78)*** 
  
(3.75)*** 
 
LOSS 
 
− 
 
-1.200*** 
  
-1.166*** 
  
-1.252*** 
 
    
(-11.39)*** 
  
(-10.04)*** 
  
(-6.79)*** 
 
SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.567*** 
  
-0.605*** 
  
-1.592*** 
 
    
(-6.21)*** 
  
(-6.03)*** 
  
(-9.38)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
7,654ii 
  
7,654ii 
  
7,654ii 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.21*** 
  
0.32*** 
  
0.49*** 
 
    
          *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-
tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models use 
ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for 
variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  Columns labeled "%" present changes in 
the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in conference call disclosure frequency. 
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5.1.2 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 7, Panel A examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
will be associated with higher credit rating scores, and that this effect will be greater 
during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CIG# are positive 
and significant (p≤0.01)  across all models which suggests that, in terms of the percent 
change in the odds ratio, a one standard deviation increase in earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency increases the odds of a higher credit rating score between 17.7% 
and  22.6%.  The coefficients for the interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS indicate whether 
the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms’ credit rating scores varies 
with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the 
interaction term is significant (p≤0.10) suggesting that a one standard deviation increase 
in earnings guidance disclosure frequency increases the odds of going from a 
speculative-grade credit rating to an investment-grade credit rating by an additional 
0.4% when credit is rationed which provides some support for H1. 
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TABLE 7 
            
Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions 
            
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey 
    
(1) 
RATINGS1  
(2) 
RATINGS2  
(3) 
RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
CIG# 
 
+ 
 
0.050*** 22.6% 
 
0.050*** 22.6% 
 
0.040*** 17.7% 
    
(4.42)*** 
  
(4.22)*** 
  
(2.49)*** 
 
CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
+ 
 
-0.000*** 0.0% 
 
0.000*** 0.0% 
 
0.001*** 0.4% 
    
(-0.00)*** 
  
(0.85)*** 
  
(1.61)*** 
 
DTA 
 
− 
 
-3.599*** 
  
-3.825*** 
  
-5.068*** 
 
    
(-9.82)*** 
  
(-9.84)*** 
  
(-8.87)*** 
 
LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.161*** 
  
1.174*** 
  
1.387*** 
 
    
(21.16)*** 
  
(20.40)*** 
  
(16.05)*** 
 
ROA 
 
+ 
 
9.722*** 
  
10.111*** 
  
11.093*** 
 
    
(11.89)*** 
  
(10.84)*** 
  
(7.33)*** 
 
COV 
 
+ 
 
0.005*** 
  
0.005*** 
  
-0.000*** 
 
    
(1.69)*** 
  
(1.64)*** 
  
(-0.04)*** 
 
CAP 
 
? 
 
0.987*** 
  
0.974*** 
  
1.392*** 
 
    
(5.94)*** 
  
(5.47)*** 
  
(5.16)*** 
 
LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.712*** 
  
-0.680*** 
  
-0.648*** 
 
    
(-6.16)*** 
  
(-5.27)*** 
  
(-3.26)*** 
 
SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.777*** 
  
-0.827*** 
  
-1.732*** 
 
    
(-7.39)*** 
  
(-6.95)*** 
  
(-9.52)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,866* 
  
6,866* 
  
6,866* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.21*** 
  
0.32*** 
  
0.48*** 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
            
Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
    
(1) 
RATINGS1  
(2) 
RATINGS2  
(3) 
RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
CIG# 
 
+ 
 
0.050*** 22.6% 
 
0.049*** 22.1% 
 
0.039*** 17.2% 
    
(4.44)*** 
  
(4.20)*** 
  
(2.41)*** 
 
CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
+ 
 
-0.000*** 0.0% 
 
0.004*** 1.6% 
 
0.015*** 6.3% 
    
(-0.01)*** 
  
(0.75)*** 
  
(1.60)*** 
 
DTA 
 
− 
 
-3.599*** 
  
-3.824*** 
  
-5.066*** 
 
    
(-9.82)*** 
  
(-9.84)*** 
  
(-8.86)*** 
 
LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.161*** 
  
1.174*** 
  
1.387*** 
 
    
(21.16)*** 
  
(20.41)*** 
  
(16.05)*** 
 
ROA 
 
+ 
 
9.722*** 
  
10.108*** 
  
11.082*** 
 
    
(11.89)*** 
  
(10.84)*** 
  
(7.32)*** 
 
COV 
 
+ 
 
0.005*** 
  
0.005*** 
  
-0.000*** 
 
    
(1.69)*** 
  
(1.64)*** 
  
(-0.04)*** 
 
CAP 
 
? 
 
0.987*** 
  
0.974*** 
  
1.390*** 
 
    
(5.94)*** 
  
(5.47)*** 
  
(5.16)*** 
 
LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.712*** 
  
-0.680*** 
  
-0.648*** 
 
    
(-6.16)*** 
  
(-5.27)*** 
  
(-3.26)*** 
 
SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.777*** 
  
-0.827*** 
  
-1.733*** 
 
    
(-7.39)*** 
  
(-6.96)*** 
  
(-9.52)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,866* 
  
6,866* 
  
6,866* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.21*** 
  
0.316*** 
  
0.478*** 
 
    
          *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-
tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models use 
ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for 
variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  Columns labeled "%" present changes in 
the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency. 
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Table 7, Panel B examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that greater earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency will be associated with higher credit rating scores, and that this effect will be 
greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CIG# are 
positive and significant (p≤0.01)  across all models which suggests that, in terms of the 
percent change in the odds ratio, a one standard deviation increase in earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency increases the odds of a higher credit rating score between 17.2% 
and  22.6%.  The coefficients for the interaction term CIG#×∆KCFSI indicate whether 
the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms’ credit rating scores varies 
with changes in the financial stress index.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction 
term is significant (p≤0.10) suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in earnings 
guidance disclosure frequency increases the odds of going from a speculative-grade 
credit rating to an investment-grade credit rating by an additional 6.3% when credit is 
rationed which provides some support for H1. 
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5.1.3 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 8, Panel A examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes in 
the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that an increase in 
conference call disclosure frequency will result in an increase in the odds of an improved 
credit rating score, and that this effect will be greater during periods of credit rationing.  
In Model 2, the coefficient for the main effect ∆CC# is positive and significant (p≤0.10) 
which suggests that, in terms of the percent change in the odds ratio, a one standard 
deviation increase in the change in conference call disclosure frequency increases the 
odds of an improved credit rating score by 11%.  The coefficients for the interaction 
term ∆CC#×∆SLOOS indicate whether the effect of changes in conference call 
disclosure frequency on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores varies with 
changes in the senior loan officer survey.  However, the coefficients for all interaction 
terms are insignificant across all models and provide no support for H1. 
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TABLE 8 
            
Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions 
            
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
    
(1) 
∆RATINGS1  
(2) 
∆RATINGS2  
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
∆CC# 
 
+ 
 
0.028*** 3.4% 
 
0.087*** 11.0% 
 
0.031*** 3.8% 
    
(0.74)*** 
  
(1.58)*** 
  
(0.30)*** 
 
∆CC# × ∆SLOOS 
 
+ 
 
-0.001*** -0.1% 
 
-0.003*** -0.4% 
 
0.004*** 0.5% 
    
(-0.58)*** 
  
(-1.31)*** 
  
(1.22)*** 
 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
-4.798*** 
  
-4.436*** 
  
-2.381*** 
 
    
(-13.08)*** 
  
(-9.34)*** 
  
(-3.92)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.412*** 
  
1.223*** 
  
1.365*** 
 
    
(8.18)*** 
  
(6.05)*** 
  
(5.00)*** 
 
∆ROA 
 
+ 
 
2.814*** 
  
2.380*** 
  
1.074*** 
 
    
(5.34)*** 
  
(3.98)*** 
  
(1.30)*** 
 
∆COV 
 
+ 
 
0.000*** 
  
0.002*** 
  
0.008*** 
 
    
(0.29)*** 
  
(1.15)*** 
  
(3.12)*** 
 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
0.862*** 
  
-0.109*** 
  
0.483*** 
 
    
(2.10)*** 
  
(-0.21)*** 
  
(0.62)*** 
 
∆LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.537*** 
  
-0.455*** 
  
-0.541*** 
 
    
(-6.55)*** 
  
(-3.99)*** 
  
(-2.88)*** 
 
∆SUB 
 
− 
 
0.039*** 
  
0.130*** 
  
-0.086*** 
 
    
(0.34)*** 
  
(0.79)*** 
  
(-0.30)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,647* 
  
6,647* 
  
6,647* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.06*** 
  
0.08*** 
  
0.04*** 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
    
(1) 
∆RATINGS1  
(2) 
∆RATINGS2  
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
∆CC# 
 
+ 
 
0.021*** 2.6% 
 
0.070*** 8.8% 
 
0.039*** 4.8% 
    
(0.59)*** 
  
(1.30)*** 
  
(0.37)*** 
 
∆CC# × ∆KCFSI 
 
+ 
 
0.004*** 0.5% 
 
-0.023*** -2.7% 
 
0.133*** 17.4% 
    
(0.09)*** 
  
(-0.37)*** 
  
(1.94)*** 
 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
-4.800*** 
  
-4.441*** 
  
-2.374*** 
 
    
(-13.08)*** 
  
(-9.34)*** 
  
(-3.91)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.413*** 
  
1.222*** 
  
1.370*** 
 
    
(8.18)*** 
  
(6.04)*** 
  
(5.00)*** 
 
∆ROA 
 
+ 
 
2.813*** 
  
2.365*** 
  
1.109*** 
 
    
(5.34)*** 
  
(3.95)*** 
  
(1.34)*** 
 
∆COV 
 
+ 
 
0.000*** 
  
0.002*** 
  
0.008*** 
 
    
(0.29)*** 
  
(1.13)*** 
  
(3.18)*** 
 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
0.866*** 
  
-0.107*** 
  
0.486*** 
 
    
(2.11)*** 
  
(-0.20)*** 
  
(0.62)*** 
 
∆LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.537*** 
  
-0.457*** 
  
-0.536*** 
 
    
(-6.56)*** 
  
(-4.01)*** 
  
(-2.85)*** 
 
∆SUB 
 
− 
 
0.039*** 
  
0.128*** 
  
-0.085*** 
 
    
(0.34)*** 
  
(0.78)*** 
  
(-0.30)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,647* 
  
6,647* 
  
6,647* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.06*** 
  
0.08*** 
  
0.04*** 
 
    
          *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-
tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models use 
ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for 
variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  Columns labeled "%" present changes in 
the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in the change in conference call disclosure frequency. 
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Table 8, Panel B examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes in 
the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that an 
increase in conference call disclosure frequency will result in an increase in the odds of 
an improved credit rating score, and that this effect will be greater during periods of 
credit rationing.  In Model 2, the coefficient for the main effect ∆CC# is positive and 
significant (p≤0.10) which suggests that, in terms of the percent change in the odds ratio, 
a one standard deviation increase in the change in conference call disclosure frequency 
increases the odds of an improved credit rating score by 8.8%.  The coefficients for the 
interaction term ∆CC#×∆KCFSI indicate whether the effect of changes in conference 
call disclosure frequency on firms’ credit rating scores varies with changes in the 
financial stress index.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term is significant 
(p≤0.05) suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in the change in conference 
call disclosure frequency increases the odds of a credit rating improvement from 
speculative-grade to investment-grade by an additional 17.4% when credit is rationed 
which provides some support for H1.  
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5.1.4 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 9, Panel A examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes 
in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that an increase 
in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will result in an increase in the odds of an 
improved credit rating score, and that this effect will be greater during periods of credit 
rationing.  In Models 1 and 3, the coefficient for the main effect ∆CIG# is positive and 
significant which suggests that, in terms of the percent change in the odds ratio, a one 
standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
increases the odds of an improved credit rating score between 7.8% and 14%.  The 
coefficients for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆SLOOS indicate whether the effect of 
changes in earnings guidance disclosure frequency on subsequent changes in firms’ 
credit rating scores varies with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  In Model 2, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is significant (p≤0.10) suggesting that a one standard 
deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency increases the 
odds of a credit rating improvement by an additional 0.3% when credit is rationed.  In 
Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term is significant (p≤0.05) suggesting that a 
one standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
increases the odds of a credit rating improvement from speculative-grade to investment-
grade by an additional 0.3% when credit is rationed.  These findings provide support for 
H1.   
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TABLE 9 
            
Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions 
            
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure  Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey 
    
(1) 
∆RATINGS1  
(2) 
∆RATINGS2  
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
∆CIG# 
 
+ 
 
0.023*** 7.8% 
 
0.017*** 5.7% 
 
0.040*** 14.0% 
    
(2.49)*** 
  
(1.27)*** 
  
(1.89)*** 
 
∆CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
+ 
 
0.000*** 0.0% 
 
0.001*** 0.3% 
 
0.001*** 0.3% 
    
(1.04)*** 
  
(1.47)*** 
  
(2.19)*** 
 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
-5.427*** 
  
-5.466*** 
  
-4.125*** 
 
    
(-12.78)*** 
  
(-9.72)*** 
  
(-5.52)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.741*** 
  
1.971*** 
  
1.586*** 
 
    
(8.76)*** 
  
(8.03)*** 
  
(4.54)*** 
 
∆ROA 
 
+ 
 
2.472*** 
  
1.733*** 
  
0.796*** 
 
    
(4.27)*** 
  
(2.48)*** 
  
(0.81)*** 
 
∆COV 
 
+ 
 
-0.001*** 
  
0.001*** 
  
0.004*** 
 
    
(-0.71)*** 
  
(-0.35)*** 
  
(1.74)*** 
 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
1.413*** 
  
1.755*** 
  
1.849*** 
 
    
(2.52)*** 
  
(2.58)*** 
  
(1.64)*** 
 
∆LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.635*** 
  
-0.558*** 
  
-0.391*** 
 
    
(-6.67)*** 
  
(-4.16)*** 
  
(-1.76)*** 
 
∆SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.396*** 
  
-0.182*** 
  
-0.433*** 
 
    
(-2.94)*** 
  
(-0.86)*** 
  
(-1.45)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,079* 
  
6,079* 
  
6,079* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.07*** 
  
0.08*** 
  
0.06*** 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
            
Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
    
(1) 
∆RATINGS1  
(2) 
∆RATINGS2  
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
Variable 
 
Sign 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
 
Log-odds % 
∆CIG# 
 
+ 
 
0.022*** 7.5% 
 
0.016*** 5.4% 
 
0.039*** 13.7% 
    
(2.46)*** 
  
(1.24)*** 
  
(1.85)*** 
 
∆CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
+ 
 
0.009*** 3.0% 
 
0.022*** 7.5% 
 
0.040*** 14.0% 
    
(0.95)*** 
  
(1.72)*** 
  
(2.77)*** 
 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
-5.423*** 
  
-5.460*** 
  
-4.111*** 
 
    
(-12.76)*** 
  
(-9.71)*** 
  
(-5.49)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE 
 
+ 
 
1.741*** 
  
1.972*** 
  
1.592*** 
 
    
(8.76)*** 
  
(8.05)*** 
  
(4.58)*** 
 
∆ROA 
 
+ 
 
2.474*** 
  
1.736*** 
  
0.815*** 
 
    
(4.28)*** 
  
(2.48)*** 
  
(0.83)*** 
 
∆COV 
 
+ 
 
-0.001*** 
  
-0.001*** 
  
0.004*** 
 
    
(-0.72)*** 
  
(-0.35)*** 
  
(1.73)*** 
 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
1.415*** 
  
1.761*** 
  
1.862*** 
 
    
(2.52)*** 
  
(2.59)*** 
  
(1.66)*** 
 
∆LOSS 
 
− 
 
-0.635*** 
  
-0.559*** 
  
-0.390*** 
 
    
(-6.67)*** 
  
(-4.16)*** 
  
(-1.76)*** 
 
∆SUB 
 
− 
 
-0.396*** 
  
0.182*** 
  
-0.434*** 
 
    
(-2.94)*** 
  
(-0.86)*** 
  
(-1.45)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Observations 
   
6,079* 
  
6,079* 
  
6,079* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
   
0.07*** 
  
0.08*** 
  
0.06*** 
 
    
          *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-
tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models use 
ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for 
variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  Columns labeled "%" present changes in 
the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency. 
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Table 9, Panel B examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes 
in the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that an 
increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will result in an increase in the odds 
of an improved credit rating score, and that this effect will be greater during periods of 
credit rationing.  In Models 1 and 3, the coefficients for the main effect ∆CIG# are 
positive and significant which suggests that, in terms of the percent change in the odds 
ratio, a one standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency increases the odds of an improved credit rating score between 7.5% and 
13.7%.  The coefficients for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆KCFSI indicate whether the 
effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms’ credit rating 
scores varies with changes in the financial stress index.  In Model 2, the coefficient for 
the interaction term is significant (p≤0.05) suggesting that a one standard deviation 
increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency increases the odds of a 
credit rating improvement by an additional 7.5% when credit is rationed.  In Model 3, 
the coefficient for the interaction term is significant (p≤0.01) suggesting that a one 
standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
increases the odds of a credit rating improvement from speculative-grade to investment-
grade by an additional 14% when credit is rationed.  These findings provide support for 
H1.   
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5.2 Analysis of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Interest Rates Across Credit 
Market Conditions 
Where levels and changes in INTRATE are used as the dependent variable, 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using ordinary least squares regression.  All models 
include year and industry fixed effects, and estimates are based on Roger’s (1993) 
corrected standard errors clustered by firm.  Results from levels-model testing of the 
effects of voluntary disclosure on interest rates across credit market conditions are 
shown in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.  Results from changes-model testing of the effects of 
voluntary disclosure on interest rates across credit market conditions are shown in 
Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.   
Given the way the variable is derived, higher levels of INTRATE and positive 
changes in ∆INTRATE imply a higher cost of debt capital.  The expected direction of 
influence of the voluntary disclosure variables, credit market condition variables, and 
their interactions are reversed relative to the expected signs in shown in previous Tables.  
As a result, I expect that greater conference call and earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency will be negatively associated with firms’ interest rate and that this negative 
association will become greater during periods of credit rationing.  The predicted 
direction of influence for the control variables are also reversed with the exception of 
capital intensity (CAP and ∆CAP), which has no predicted direction of influence, and 
leverage (DTA and ∆DTA), which has been shown in prior literature to be negatively 
related to firms’ interest rates (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Francis et al. 2005). 
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5.2.1 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 10, Panel A examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that greater conference call disclosure frequency will be 
associated with lower interest rates, and that this effect will be greater during periods of 
credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CC# is negative and significant 
(p≤0.01) suggesting that greater conference call disclosure frequency is associated with 
lower interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS indicates 
whether the effect of conference call disclosure frequency on firms’ interest rates varies 
with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  However, the coefficient is insignificant 
and provides no support for H1. 
Table 10, Panel B examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that greater conference call disclosure 
frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and that this effect will be greater 
during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CC# is negative 
and significant (p≤0.01) suggesting that greater conference call disclosure frequency is 
associated with lower interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term 
CC#×∆KCFSI indicates whether the effect of conference call disclosure frequency on 
firms’ interest rates varies with changes in the financial stress index.  However, the 
coefficient is insignificant and provides no support for H1. 
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TABLE 10 
      Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on Interest 
Rates Across Credit Market Conditions 
      Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
INTRATE 
Constant    
 
9.693*** 
 
   
 
(21.42)*** 
CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.145*** 
    
 
(-3.56)*** 
CC# ×  ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
0.002*** 
    
 
(1.07)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.710*** 
    
 
(-3.04)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.332*** 
    
 
(-12.43)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.780*** 
    
 
(-5.22)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
    
 
(-0.18)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.372*** 
    
 
(2.78)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.843*** 
    
 
(7.61)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.325*** 
    
 
(12.26)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
18,665* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.09*** 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
      Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
INTRATE 
Constant    
 
9.305*** 
 
   
 
(17.48)*** 
CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.138*** 
    
 
(-3.29)*** 
CC# ×  ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.033*** 
 
   
 
(-0.44)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.709*** 
    
 
(-3.03)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.332*** 
    
 
(-12.47)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.781*** 
    
 
(-5.23)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
    
 
(-0.19)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.373*** 
    
 
(2.79)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.844*** 
    
 
(7.62)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.326*** 
 
   
 
(12.26)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
18,665* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.09*** 
    
    *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All 
models use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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5.2.2 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 11, Panel A examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
will be associated with lower interest rates, and that this effect will be greater during 
periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CIG# is negative and 
significant (p≤0.01) suggesting that greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency is 
associated with lower interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term 
CIG#×∆SLOOS indicates whether the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
on firms’ interest rates varies with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  However, 
the coefficient is insignificant and provides no support for H1. 
Table 11, Panel B examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that greater earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and that this effect will be greater 
during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CIG# is negative 
and significant (p≤0.01) suggesting that greater earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
is associated with lower interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term 
CIG#×∆KCFSI indicates whether the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
on firms’ interest rates varies with changes in the financial stress index.  However, the 
coefficient is insignificant and provides no support for H1. 
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TABLE 11 
      Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions 
      
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
INTRATE 
Constant    
 
10.251*** 
 
   
 
(23.17)*** 
CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.045*** 
    
 
(-3.92)*** 
CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
 
   
 
(-0.93)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-2.208*** 
    
 
(-7.67)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.283*** 
    
 
(-10.21)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.564*** 
    
 
(-3.25)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(-3.90)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.016*** 
    
 
(0.11)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.706*** 
    
 
(5.98)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.508*** 
 
   
 
(13.90)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
14,618* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.12*** 
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
      Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial 
Stress Index 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
INTRATE 
Constant    
 
10.253*** 
 
   
 
(23.17)*** 
CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.044*** 
    
 
(-3.83)*** 
CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.006*** 
 
   
 
(-0.70)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-2.209*** 
    
 
(-7.67)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.283*** 
    
 
(-10.21)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.566*** 
    
 
(-3.25)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(-3.89)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.016*** 
    
 
(0.11)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.706*** 
    
 
(5.98)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.508*** 
 
   
 
(13.90)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
14,618* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.12*** 
    
    *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All 
models use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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5.2.3 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 12, Panel A examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that an increase in 
conference call disclosure frequency will result in a reduction in interest rates, and that 
this effect will be greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main 
effect ∆CC# is negative and significant (p≤0.05) suggesting that positive changes in 
conference call disclosure frequency reduce firms’ interest rates.  The coefficient for the 
interaction term ∆CC#×∆SLOOS indicates whether the effect of changes in conference 
call disclosure frequency on changes in firms’ interest rates varies with changes in the 
senior loan officer survey.  Contrary to H1, the coefficient for the interaction is positive 
and significant (p≤0.10) suggesting that the negative association between changes in  
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TABLE 12 
      Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions 
      
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
∆INTRATE 
Constant    
 
0.142*** 
 
   
 
(0.42)*** 
∆CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.100*** 
    
 
(-2.04)*** 
∆CC# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
0.004*** 
    
 
(1.87)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.470*** 
    
 
(-0.96)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.898*** 
    
 
(-4.11)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.489*** 
    
 
(-0.96)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
    
 
(0.31)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.490*** 
    
 
(-0.85)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.263*** 
    
 
(2.42)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.198*** 
 
   
 
(0.89)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
15,042* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.01*** 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
      Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
∆INTRATE 
Constant    
 
0.025*** 
 
   
 
(0.07)*** 
∆CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.088*** 
    
 
(-1.77)*** 
∆CC# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
0.059*** 
 
   
 
(1.05)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.464*** 
    
 
(-0.95)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.900*** 
    
 
(-4.12)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.470*** 
    
 
(-0.92)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
    
 
(0.31)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.493*** 
    
 
(-0.86)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.263*** 
    
 
(2.42)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.198*** 
 
   
 
(0.89)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
15,042* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.01*** 
    
    *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All 
models use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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conference call disclosure frequency and subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates 
attenuates during periods of credit rationing.  This finding provides no support for H1. 
Table 12, Panel B examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that an increase 
in conference call disclosure frequency will result in a reduction in interest rates, and 
that this effect will be greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the 
main effect ∆CC# is negative and significant (p≤0.05) suggesting that positive changes 
in conference call disclosure frequency reduce firms’ interest rates.  The coefficient for 
the interaction term ∆CC#×∆KCFSI indicates whether the effect of changes in 
conference call disclosure frequency on changes in firms’ interest rates varies with 
changes in the financial stress index.  However, the coefficient for the interaction term is 
insignificant provides no support for H1. 
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5.2.4 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions  
Table 13, Panel A examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS).  I expect that an increase in 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency will result in a reduction in interest rates, and 
that this effect will be greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the 
main effect ∆CIG# is negative but insignificant suggesting that positive changes in 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency has no effect on subsequent changes in firms’ 
interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆SLOOS indicates 
whether the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure frequency on changes in 
firms’ interest rates varies with changes in the senior loan officer survey.  However, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is insignificant provides no support for H1. 
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TABLE 13 
      Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions 
      
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
∆INTRATE 
Constant    
 
-0.772*** 
 
   
 
(-1.39)*** 
∆CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.013*** 
    
 
(-1.03)*** 
∆CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
    
 
(-0.46)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.236*** 
    
 
(-2.30)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.720*** 
    
 
(-2.89)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.548*** 
    
 
(-2.36)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.001*** 
    
 
(0.89)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.755*** 
    
 
(-1.09)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.094*** 
    
 
(0.77)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.309*** 
 
   
 
(1.28)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
11,486* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.02*** 
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TABLE 13 (continued) 
      Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial 
Stress Index 
      
Variable  
Sign 
 
 
∆INTRATE 
Constant    
 
-0.775*** 
 
   
 
(-1.40)*** 
∆CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.011*** 
    
 
(-0.92)*** 
∆CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.017*** 
 
   
 
(-1.29)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.235*** 
    
 
(-2.30)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.721*** 
    
 
(-2.89)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.547*** 
    
 
(-2.36)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.001*** 
    
 
(0.88)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.760*** 
    
 
(-1.09)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.094*** 
    
 
(0.78)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.309*** 
 
   
 
(1.28)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
11,486* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.02*** 
    
    *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All 
models use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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Table 13, Panel B examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI).  I expect that an increase 
in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will result in a reduction in interest rates, and 
that this effect will be greater during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the 
main effect ∆CIG# is negative but insignificant suggesting that positive changes in 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency has no effect on subsequent changes in firms’ 
interest rates.  The coefficient for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆KCFSI indicates 
whether the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms’ 
interest rates varies with changes in the financial stress index.  The coefficient for the 
interaction term is negative and significant (p≤0.10) suggesting that an increase in 
earnings guidance reduces firms’ interest rates more during periods of credit rationing.  
This result supports H1. 
  
71 
 
 
5.3 Analysis of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Credit Ratings Across Credit 
Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
Prior literature posits that smaller firms are denied credit first when credit 
becomes scarce, and that monitoring can be a partial substitute for collateral (Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1997).  Additionally, smaller firms have weaker information environments 
than larger firms and can likely benefit more from increased voluntary disclosure (Lang 
and Lundholm 1993).  If greater voluntary disclosure facilitates monitoring of 
borrowers, then, as H2 suggests, the effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt 
capital will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit 
rationing.   
To test this association, firms are ranked as small (large) if total assets for a given 
fiscal year are below (above) the median level of total assets for all firms in the same 
fiscal year.  Equations (1) and (2) are then estimated for the smallest and largest firms 
separately.  All models include year and industry fixed effects, and estimates are based 
on Roger’s (1993) corrected standard errors clustered by firm.  Coefficients are reported 
in log-odds format, and the percent change in the odds ratio is also reported for the 
coefficients of the main and interaction effects of my voluntary disclosure variables.  
Results from levels-model testing of the effects of conference call and earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency on firms’ credit rating scores for small and large firms are 
examined in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.  Results from changes-model testing are examined 
in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.   
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5.3.1 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm 
Size 
Table 14, Panel A examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
conference call disclosure frequency will be associated with higher credit rating scores, 
and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of 
credit rationing.  In Model 1, the coefficient for the main effect CC# is positive and 
significant for the smaller-firm subsample and negative and significant for the larger-
firm subsample.  Also, the coefficients for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS are 
insignificant for both the smaller-firm and the larger firm subsamples in Model 1.  In 
Models 2 and 3, the coefficients for the main effect CC# are positive and significant for 
the smaller-firm subsamples but not the larger-firm subsamples, and the coefficients for 
the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS is insignificant for both the smaller-firm and the 
larger firm subsamples in both Models.  For all Models, the combined effect from the 
main effect (CC#) and the interaction (CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that conference call 
disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than larger firms even 
during periods of credit rationing.  That is, the summed percent change in the odds ratio 
for the main effects and interaction effects is greater for the smaller-firm subsamples 
than the larger-firm subsamples across all models, which supports H2.     
  
  
 
TABLE 14 
              
Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
              
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
  
(1) 
RATINGS1 
(2) 
RATINGS2 
(3) 
RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
CC# + 0.165*** 19.5% -0.109*** -11.6% 0.171*** 20.3% -0.075*** -8.1% 0.166*** 19.6% 0.106*** -11.3% 
  
(3.37)*** 
 
(-2.25)*** 
 
(3.03)*** 
 
(-1.47)*** 
 
(1.70)*** 
 
(-1.34)*** 
 
CC# × ∆SLOOS + -0.002*** -0.2% 0.002*** 0.2% -0.001*** -0.1% 0.001*** 0.1% 0.002*** 0.2% -0.001*** -0.1% 
  
(-0.88)*** 
 
(1.24)*** 
 
(-0.50)*** 
 
(0.34)*** 
 
(0.42)*** 
 
(-0.20)*** 
 
DTA − -2.779*** 
 
-4.239*** 
 
-3.215*** 
 
-4.304*** 
 
-5.408*** 
 
-4.903*** 
 
  
(-8.93)*** 
 
(-7.46)*** 
 
(-9.72)*** 
 
(-7.07)*** 
 
(-6.46)*** 
 
(-6.71)*** 
 
LNSIZE + 1.455*** 
 
0.937*** 
 
1.524*** 
 
0.949*** 
 
2.447*** 
 
0.950*** 
 
  
(15.39)*** 
 
(12.34)*** 
 
(13.78)*** 
 
(11.67)*** 
 
(10.53)*** 
 
(9.07)*** 
 
ROA + 6.556*** 
 
10.674*** 
 
7.373*** 
 
10.614*** 
 
9.931*** 
 
10.493*** 
 
  
(9.81)*** 
 
(9.70)*** 
 
(8.71)*** 
 
(8.93)*** 
 
(4.38)*** 
 
(4.81)*** 
 
COV + 0.006*** 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
  
(1.24)*** 
 
(2.06)*** 
 
(0.87)*** 
 
(1.96)*** 
 
(-0.37)*** 
 
(0.59)*** 
 
CAP ? 0.744*** 
 
0.388*** 
 
0.728*** 
 
0.330*** 
 
1.618*** 
 
0.331*** 
 
  
(4.40)*** 
 
(2.06)*** 
 
(4.02)*** 
 
(1.63)*** 
 
(4.87)*** 
 
(1.13)*** 
 
LOSS − -1.342*** 
 
-1.040*** 
 
-1.198*** 
 
-1.105*** 
 
-0.949*** 
 
-1.078*** 
 
  
(-
10.75)***  
(-6.30)*** 
 
(-8.40)*** 
 
(-6.56)*** 
 
(-3.13)*** 
 
(-4.83)*** 
 
SUB − -0.473*** 
 
-0.742*** 
 
-0.556*** 
 
-0.700*** 
 
-2.118*** 
 
-1.365*** 
 
  
(-4.39)*** 
 
(-4.63)*** 
 
(-4.71)*** 
 
(-3.95)*** 
 
(-7.57)*** 
 
(-5.93)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
0.28*** 
 
0.26*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.38*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
19.5%   -11.6% 
 
20.3%   0.0% 
 
19.6%   0.0% 
Supports H2 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
  
7
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
              
Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
  
(1) 
RATINGS1 
(2) 
RATINGS2 
(3) 
RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
CC# + 0.160*** 18.8% -0.112*** -11.9% 0.168*** 19.9% -0.082*** -8.9% 0.172*** 20.4% -0.108*** -11.5% 
  
(3.30)*** 
 
(-2.38)*** 
 
(3.06)*** 
 
(-1.65)*** 
 
(1.84)*** 
 
(-1.40)*** 
 
CC# × ∆KCFSI + -0.041*** -4.3% 0.136*** 16.6% -0.075*** -7.8% 0.109*** 13.1% 0.079*** 8.9% 0.017*** -1.9% 
  
(-0.46)*** 
 
(2.56)*** 
 
(-0.72)*** 
 
(1.89)*** 
 
(0.39)*** 
 
(-0.16)*** 
 
DTA − -2.779*** 
 
-4.232*** 
 
-3.213*** 
 
-4.300*** 
 
-5.410*** 
 
-4.904*** 
 
  
(-8.94)*** 
 
(-7.45)*** 
 
(-9.71)*** 
 
(-7.07)*** 
 
(-6.46)*** 
 
(-6.72)*** 
 
LNSIZE + 1.455*** 
 
0.939*** 
 
1.525*** 
 
0.950*** 
 
2.447*** 
 
0.950*** 
 
  
(15.40)*** 
 
(12.36)*** 
 
(13.78)*** 
 
(11.69)*** 
 
(10.52)*** 
 
(9.06)*** 
 
ROA + 6.561*** 
 
10.696*** 
 
7.375*** 
 
10.630*** 
 
9.941*** 
 
10.491*** 
 
  
(9.81)*** 
 
(9.70)*** 
 
(8.71)*** 
 
(8.93)*** 
 
(4.38)*** 
 
(4.81)*** 
 
COV + 0.006*** 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
  
(1.24)*** 
 
(2.06)*** 
 
(0.88)*** 
 
(1.98)*** 
 
(-0.38)*** 
 
(0.59)*** 
 
CAP ? 0.745*** 
 
0.390*** 
 
0.728*** 
 
0.333*** 
 
1.618*** 
 
0.331*** 
 
  
(4.40)*** 
 
(2.08)*** 
 
(4.01)*** 
 
(1.64)*** 
 
(4.88)*** 
 
(1.13)*** 
 
LOSS − -1.341*** 
 
-1.043*** 
 
-1.198*** 
 
-1.109*** 
 
-0.950*** 
 
-1.079*** 
 
  
(-
10.74)***  
(-6.33)*** 
 
(-8.40)*** 
 
(-6.59)*** 
 
(-3.13)*** 
 
(-4.83)*** 
 
SUB − -0.474*** 
 
-0.743*** 
 
-0.557*** 
 
-0.699*** 
 
-2.118*** 
 
-1.365*** 
 
  
(-4.40)*** 
 
(-4.64)*** 
 
(-4.71)*** 
 
(-3.94)*** 
 
(-7.56)*** 
 
(-5.93)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
3,826* 
 
3,828* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
0.28*** 
 
0.26*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.38*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
18.8%   4.7% 
 
19.9%   4.3% 
 
20.4%   0.0% 
Supports H2   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  
All models use ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
Columns labeled "%" present changes in the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in conference call disclosure frequency. 
a Odds for insignificant coefficients are deemed zero when summing the odds. 
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Table 14, Panel B examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
conference call disclosure frequency will be associated with higher credit rating scores, 
and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of 
credit rationing.  In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients for the main effect CC# are positive 
and significant for the smaller-firm subsamples and negative and significant for the 
larger-firm subsamples.  Also, the coefficients for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS is 
insignificant for the smaller-firm subsamples but positive and significant for the larger 
firm subsamples.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the main effect CC# is positive and 
significant for the smaller-firm subsample but not the larger-firm subsample, and the 
coefficients for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS is insignificant for both the smaller-
firm and the larger firm subsamples.  For all Models, the combined effect from the main 
effect (CC#) and the interaction (CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that conference call disclosure 
frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than larger firms even during 
periods of credit rationing.  That is, the summed percent change in the odds ratio for the 
main effects and interaction effects is greater for the smaller-firm subsample than the 
larger-firm subsample, which supports H2.     
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5.3.2 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size  
Table 15, Panel A examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency will be associated with higher credit rating 
scores, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during 
periods of credit rationing.  In all Models, the coefficient for the main effect CIG# is 
positive and significant for both the smaller-firm and the larger-firm subsamples.  In 
Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and 
significant for the smaller-firm subsample only.  In Models 1 and 2, the combined effect 
from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction (CIG#×∆SLOOS) suggests that earnings 
guidance disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of larger firms than smaller 
firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does not support H2.  In Model 3, 
the combined effect from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction (CIG#×∆SLOOS) 
suggests that earnings guidance disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of 
smaller firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does 
support H2.  Overall, the results in Panel A are mixed. 
Table 15, Panel B examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ credit rating scores across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve  
  
  
 
TABLE 15 
              
Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
              
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
  
(1) 
RATINGS1 
(2) 
RATINGS2 
(3) 
RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
CIG# + 0.045*** 19.0% 0.055*** 26.0% 0.048*** 20.4% 0.054*** 25.4% 0.044*** 18.6% 0.036*** 16.3% 
  
(3.44)*** 
 
(3.28)*** 
 
(3.41)*** 
 
(3.10)*** 
 
(2.05)*** 
 
(1.58)*** 
 
CIG# × ∆SLOOS + 0.000*** 0.0% -0.000*** 0.0% 0.000*** 0.0% 0.000*** 0.0% 0.001*** 0.4% 0.000*** 0.0% 
  
(0.17)*** 
 
(-0.50)*** 
 
(1.06)*** 
 
(0.01)*** 
 
(1.64)*** 
 
(0.58)*** 
 
DTA − -3.180*** 
 
-3.905*** 
 
-3.403*** 
 
-4.011*** 
 
-5.177*** 
 
-4.174*** 
 
  
(-7.93)*** 
 
(-5.16)*** 
 
(-8.22)*** 
 
(-5.12)*** 
 
(-7.03)*** 
 
(-4.46)*** 
 
LNSIZE + 1.672*** 
 
0.923*** 
 
1.769*** 
 
0.935*** 
 
2.499*** 
 
0.924*** 
 
  
(16.46)*** 
 
(9.27)*** 
 
(14.75)*** 
 
(8.89)*** 
 
(11.56)*** 
 
(7.21)*** 
 
ROA + 7.887*** 
 
13.024*** 
 
8.552*** 
 
12.188*** 
 
11.434*** 
 
11.851*** 
 
  
(9.06)*** 
 
(8.10)*** 
 
(7.73)*** 
 
(7.54)*** 
 
(5.15)*** 
 
(4.62)*** 
 
COV + 0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
  
(1.20)*** 
 
(1.06)*** 
 
(1.09)*** 
 
(1.20)*** 
 
(-0.11)*** 
 
(0.60)*** 
 
CAP ? 1.249*** 
 
0.668*** 
 
1.362*** 
 
0.529*** 
 
2.137*** 
 
0.620*** 
 
  
(6.48)*** 
 
(2.40)*** 
 
(6.44)*** 
 
(1.80)*** 
 
(6.76)*** 
 
(1.42)*** 
 
LOSS − -0.990*** 
 
-0.376*** 
 
-0.886*** 
 
-0.485*** 
 
-0.559*** 
 
-0.553*** 
 
  
(-6.85)*** 
 
(-1.95)*** 
 
(-5.21)*** 
 
(-2.43)*** 
 
(-1.86)*** 
 
(-2.10)*** 
 
SUB − -0.664*** 
 
-1.083*** 
 
-0.807*** 
 
-0.994*** 
 
-2.071*** 
 
-1.569*** 
 
  
(-5.56)*** 
 
(-5.06)*** 
 
(-6.11)*** 
 
(-4.15)*** 
 
(-8.23)*** 
 
(-5.92)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.35*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
19.0%   26.0% 
 
20.4%   25.4% 
 
18.9%   16.3% 
Supports H2 
  
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
              
Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
              
  
(1) 
RATINGS1 
(2) 
RATINGS2 
(3) 
RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
CIG# + 0.045*** 19.0% 0.055*** 26.0% 0.047*** 19.9% 0.054*** 25.4% 0.043*** 18.1% 0.035*** 15.8% 
  
(3.46)*** 
 
(3.31)*** 
 
(3.37)*** 
 
(3.11)*** 
 
(2.01)*** 
 
(1.52)*** 
 
CIG# × ∆KCFSI + 0.003*** 1.2% 0.004*** -1.7% 0.012*** 4.8% -0.002*** -0.8% 0.028*** 11.4% 0.003*** 1.3% 
  
(0.39)*** 
 
(-0.67)*** 
 
(1.27)*** 
 
(-0.31)*** 
 
(2.05)*** 
 
(0.20)*** 
 
DTA − -3.180*** 
 
-3.906*** 
 
-3.403*** 
 
-4.011*** 
 
-5.181*** 
 
-4.169*** 
 
  
(-7.93)*** 
 
(-5.17)*** 
 
(-8.22)*** 
 
(-5.12)*** 
 
(-7.01)*** 
 
(-4.45)*** 
 
LNSIZE + 1.671*** 
 
0.923*** 
 
1.769*** 
 
0.935*** 
 
2.499*** 
 
0.924*** 
 
  
(16.47)*** 
 
(9.26)*** 
 
(14.75)*** 
 
(8.89)*** 
 
(11.55)*** 
 
(7.21)*** 
 
ROA + 7.885*** 
 
13.024*** 
 
8.545*** 
 
12.187*** 
 
11.410*** 
 
11.852*** 
 
  
(9.06)*** 
 
(8.10)*** 
 
(7.73)*** 
 
(7.54)*** 
 
(5.14)*** 
 
(4.62)*** 
 
COV + 0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
  
(1.20)*** 
 
(1.06)*** 
 
(1.09)*** 
 
(1.20)*** 
 
(-0.11)*** 
 
(0.60)*** 
 
CAP ? 1.250*** 
 
0.668*** 
 
1.362*** 
 
0.529*** 
 
2.138*** 
 
0.619*** 
 
  
(6.49)*** 
 
(2.40)*** 
 
(6.44)*** 
 
(1.80)*** 
 
(6.77)*** 
 
(1.42)*** 
 
LOSS − -0.991*** 
 
0.376*** 
 
-0.886*** 
 
-0.486*** 
 
-0.565*** 
 
-0.553*** 
 
  
(-6.85)*** 
 
(-1.95)*** 
 
(-5.21)*** 
 
(-2.44)*** 
 
(-1.88)*** 
 
(-2.11)*** 
 
SUB − -0.665*** 
 
-1.083*** 
 
-0.809*** 
 
-0.995*** 
 
-2.080*** 
 
-1.568*** 
 
  
(-5.56)*** 
 
(-5.06)*** 
 
(-6.12)*** 
 
(-4.15)*** 
 
(-8.27)*** 
 
(-5.92)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
3,429* 
 
3,437* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.35*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
19.0%   26.0% 
 
19.9%   25.4% 
 
29.5%   15.8% 
Supports H2   
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  
All models use ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
Columns labeled "%" present changes in the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency. 
a Odds for insignificant coefficients are deemed zero when summing the odds. 
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Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency will be associated with higher credit rating 
scores, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during 
periods of credit rationing.  In all Models, the coefficient for the main effect CIG# is 
positive and significant for both the smaller-firm and the larger-firm subsamples.  In 
Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and 
significant for the smaller-firm subsample only.  In Models 1 and 2, the combined effect 
from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction (CIG#×∆SLOOS) suggests that earnings 
guidance disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of larger firms than smaller 
firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does not support H2.  In Model 3, 
the combined effect from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction (CIG#×∆SLOOS) 
suggests that earnings guidance disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of 
smaller firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does 
support H2.  Overall, the results in Panel B are mixed. 
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5.3.3 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size 
Table 16, Panel A examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes in 
the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger 
firms.  I expect that an increase in conference call disclosure frequency will result in an 
increase in the odds of an improved credit rating score, and that this effect will be greater 
for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  In Models 1 and 2, 
the coefficient for the main effect ∆CC# is positive and significant for the smaller-firm 
subsample only.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term ∆CC#×∆SLOOS is 
positive and significant for the smaller-firm subsample only.  In all Models, the 
combined effect from the main effect (∆CC#) and the interaction (∆CC#×∆SLOOS) 
suggests that conference call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of smaller 
firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which supports H2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 16 
              
Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
              
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
              
  
(1) 
∆RATINGS1 
(2) 
∆RATINGS2 
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
∆CC# + 0.125*** 16.5% -0.084*** -9.5% 0.167*** 22.7% -0.002*** -0.2% -0.044*** -5.2% 0.130*** 16.6% 
  
(2.46)*** 
 
(-1.60)*** 
 
(2.33)*** 
 
(-0.02)*** 
 
(-0.33)*** 
 
(0.84)*** 
 
∆CC# ×∆SLOOS + -0.001*** -0.1% 0.000*** 0.0% -0.003*** -0.4% 0.001*** -0.1% 0.011*** 1.4% -0.001*** -0.1% 
  
(-0.52)*** 
 
(0.01)*** 
 
(-1.10)*** 
 
(-0.41)*** 
 
(1.99)*** 
 
(-0.18)*** 
 
∆DTA − -4.042*** 
 
-6.639*** 
 
-3.430*** 
 
-7.085*** 
 
-2.057*** 
 
-3.677*** 
 
  
(-9.70)*** 
 
(-8.69)*** 
 
(-6.36)*** 
 
(-7.44)*** 
 
(-2.73)*** 
 
(-3.05)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE + (-9.70)*** 
 
1.728*** 
 
0.946*** 
 
1.828*** 
 
0.881*** 
 
2.009*** 
 
  
(5.46)*** 
 
(6.69)*** 
 
(3.47)*** 
 
(6.34)*** 
 
(2.51)*** 
 
(4.90)*** 
 
∆ROA + 2.569*** 
 
3.182*** 
 
2.044*** 
 
3.117*** 
 
0.710*** 
 
2.225*** 
 
  
(4.03)*** 
 
(3.13)*** 
 
(2.71)*** 
 
(2.84)*** 
 
(0.84)*** 
 
(1.36)*** 
 
∆COV + -0.000*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
  
(-0.23)*** 
 
(0.86)*** 
 
(0.58)*** 
 
(0.78)*** 
 
(3.38)*** 
 
(0.82)*** 
 
∆CAP ? -0.008*** 
 
2.047*** 
 
-1.223*** 
 
1.525*** 
 
-0.579*** 
 
1.632*** 
 
  
(-0.02)*** 
 
(3.11)*** 
 
(-1.95)*** 
 
(1.88)*** 
 
(-0.54)*** 
 
(1.51)*** 
 
∆LOSS − -0.546*** 
 
-0.519*** 
 
-0.355*** 
 
-0.526*** 
 
-0.175*** 
 
-0.738*** 
 
  
(-5.09)*** 
 
(-4.03)*** 
 
(-2.32)*** 
 
(-3.08)*** 
 
(-0.79)*** 
 
(-2.57)*** 
 
∆SUB − -0.022*** 
 
0.074*** 
 
0.092*** 
 
0.064*** 
 
-0.215*** 
 
-0.068*** 
 
  
(-0.17)*** 
 
(0.37)*** 
 
(0.49)*** 
 
(0.19)*** 
 
(-0.95)*** 
 
(-0.11)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.10*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
16.5%   0.0% 
 
22.7%   0.0% 
 
1.4%   0.0% 
Supports H2 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
              
Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
              
  
(1) 
∆RATINGS1 
(2) 
∆RATINGS2 
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
∆CC# + 0.117*** 15.4% -0.084*** -9.5% 0.150*** 20.2% -0.010*** -1.2% -0.026*** -3.1% 0.108*** 13.6% 
  
(2.37)*** 
 
(-1.65)*** 
 
(2.13)*** 
 
(-0.13)*** 
 
(-0.19)*** 
 
(0.72)*** 
 
∆CC# × ∆KCFSI + 0.025*** 3.1% 0.002*** 0.2% 0.014*** 1.7% -0.017*** -2.0% 0.248*** 35.5% 0.096*** 12.0% 
  
(0.35)*** 
 
(0.03)*** 
 
(0.15)*** 
 
(-0.23)*** 
 
(1.72)*** 
 
(1.53)*** 
 
∆DTA − -4.041*** 
 
-6.639*** 
 
-3.426*** 
 
-7.089*** 
 
-2.052*** 
 
-3.696*** 
 
  
(-9.69)*** 
 
(-8.68)*** 
 
(-6.35)*** 
 
(-7.43)*** 
 
(-2.73)*** 
 
(-3.06)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE + 1.247*** 
 
1.728*** 
 
0.946*** 
 
1.825*** 
 
0.894*** 
 
2.005*** 
 
  
(5.47)*** 
 
(6.69)*** 
 
(3.47)*** 
 
(6.33)*** 
 
(2.52)*** 
 
(4.88)*** 
 
∆ROA + 2.574*** 
 
3.183*** 
 
2.044*** 
 
3.099*** 
 
0.736*** 
 
2.243*** 
 
  
(4.03)*** 
 
(3.13)*** 
 
(2.70)*** 
 
(2.82)*** 
 
(0.88)*** 
 
(1.37)*** 
 
∆COV + -0.000*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
  
(-0.21)*** 
 
(0.85)*** 
 
(0.59)*** 
 
(0.77)*** 
 
(3.46)*** 
 
(0.81)*** 
 
∆CAP ? 0.004*** 
 
2.047*** 
 
-1.220*** 
 
1.523*** 
 
-0.587*** 
 
1.629*** 
 
  
(0.01)*** 
 
(3.11)*** 
 
(-1.96)*** 
 
(1.87)*** 
 
(-0.54)*** 
 
(1.51)*** 
 
∆LOSS − -0.544*** 
 
-0.519*** 
 
-0.356*** 
 
-0.527*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 
-0.741*** 
 
  
(-5.08)*** 
 
(-4.03)*** 
 
(-2.32)*** 
 
(-3.09)*** 
 
(-0.76)*** 
 
(-2.56)*** 
 
∆SUB − -0.022*** 
 
0.074*** 
 
0.091*** 
 
0.065*** 
 
-0.197*** 
 
-0.071*** 
 
  
(-0.17)*** 
 
(0.37)*** 
 
(0.49)*** 
 
(0.20)*** 
 
(-0.88)*** 
 
(-0.12)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
3,322* 
 
3,325* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.08*** 
 
0.10*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
15.4%   -9.5% 
 
20.2%   0.0% 
 
35.5%   12.0% 
Supports H2   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  
All models use ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
Columns labeled "%" present changes in the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in the change in conference call disclosure frequency. 
a Odds for insignificant coefficients are deemed zero when summing the odds. 
8
2
 
83 
 
 
Table 16, Panel B examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (∆CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes in 
the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and 
larger firms.  I expect that an increase conference call disclosure frequency will result in 
an increase in the odds of an improved credit rating score, and that this effect will be 
greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  In Model 1, 
the coefficient for the main effect ∆CC# is positive and significant for the smaller-firm 
subsample but negative and significant for the larger-firm subsample.  In Model 2, the 
coefficient for the main effect ∆CC# is positive and significant for the smaller-firm 
subsample only.  In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term ∆CC#×∆SLOOS is 
positive and significant for the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples.  In all Models, 
the combined effect from the main effect (∆CC#) and the interaction (∆CC#×∆SLOOS) 
suggests that conference call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of smaller 
firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which supports H2. 
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5.3.4 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size 
Table 17, Panel A examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes 
in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and 
larger firms.  I expect that an increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will 
result in an increase in the odds of an improved credit rating score, and that this effect 
will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  In 
Models 1 and 3, the coefficient for the main effect ∆CIG# is positive and significant for 
the smaller-firm subsamples only.  In Model 1, the coefficient for the interaction term 
∆CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and significant for the smaller-firm subsample only, and in 
Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and 
significant for the larger-firm subsample only.  While the results in Model 2 are 
inconclusive, the combined effect from the main effect (∆CIG#) and the interaction 
(∆CIG#×∆SLOOS) in Models 1 and 3, suggests that earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than larger firms even during 
periods of credit rationing, which supports H2. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
TABLE 17 
              
Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Credit Ratings Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
              
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
              
  
(1) 
∆RATINGS1 
(2) 
∆RATINGS2 
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
∆CIG# + 0.039*** 13.2% 0.012*** 4.2% 0.020*** 6.5% 0.014*** 4.9% 0.067*** 23.7% 0.022*** 7.8% 
  
(3.07)*** 
 
(0.90)*** 
 
(1.00)*** 
 
(0.85)*** 
 
(1.95)*** 
 
(0.82)*** 
 
∆CIG# × ∆SLOOS + 0.001*** 0.3% -0.000*** 0.0% 0.001*** 0.3% 0.001*** 0.3% 0.001*** 0.3% 0.002*** 0.7% 
  
(1.93)*** 
 
(-0.09)*** 
 
(1.13)*** 
 
(1.13)*** 
 
(0.80)*** 
 
(2.24)*** 
 
∆DTA − -4.845*** 
 
-6.832*** 
 
-4.501*** 
 
-7.536*** 
 
-3.078*** 
 
-5.786*** 
 
  
(-9.36)*** 
 
(-8.75)*** 
 
(-6.52)*** 
 
(-7.40)*** 
 
(-3.40)*** 
 
(-4.40)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE + 2.164*** 
 
1.303*** 
 
2.166*** 
 
1.811*** 
 
1.269*** 
 
1.879*** 
 
  
(8.48)*** 
 
(4.56)*** 
 
(6.71)*** 
 
(4.83)*** 
 
(2.91)*** 
 
(3.21)*** 
 
∆ROA + 1.708*** 
 
3.778*** 
 
1.089*** 
 
3.183*** 
 
0.284*** 
 
2.581*** 
 
  
(2.37)*** 
 
(3.45)*** 
 
(1.22)*** 
 
(2.91)*** 
 
(0.28)*** 
 
(1.45)*** 
 
∆COV + 0.001*** 
 
-0.000*** 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
  
(-0.94)*** 
 
(-0.10)*** 
 
(-0.50)*** 
 
(-0.24)*** 
 
(2.42)*** 
 
(-1.05)*** 
 
∆CAP ? 1.371*** 
 
1.220*** 
 
1.450*** 
 
1.859*** 
 
1.722*** 
 
1.838*** 
 
  
(1.72)*** 
 
(1.54)*** 
 
(1.65)*** 
 
(1.75)*** 
 
(1.08)*** 
 
(1.01)*** 
 
∆LOSS − -0.738*** 
 
-0.507*** 
 
-0.588*** 
 
-0.399*** 
 
-0.086*** 
 
-0.509*** 
 
  
(-5.85)*** 
 
(-3.37)*** 
 
(-3.50)*** 
 
(-1.85)*** 
 
(-0.31)*** 
 
(-1.52)*** 
 
∆SUB − -0.351*** 
 
-0.569*** 
 
-0.299*** 
 
-0.090*** 
 
0.510*** 
 
-0.500*** 
 
  
(-2.23)*** 
 
(-2.57)*** 
 
(-1.19)*** 
 
(-0.26)*** 
 
(-1.59)*** 
 
(-0.90)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
13.5%   0.0% 
 
0.0%   0.0% 
 
23.7%   0.7% 
Supports H2 
  
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
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TABLE 17 (continued) 
              
Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
              
  
(1) 
∆RATINGS1 
(2) 
∆RATINGS2 
(3) 
∆RATINGS3 
  
Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms Smaller Firms Larger Firms 
Variable   Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % Log-odds % 
∆CIG# + 0.038*** 12.8% 0.012*** 4.2% 0.018*** 5.9% 0.015*** 5.2% 0.065*** 22.9% 0.024*** 8.5% 
  
(2.97)*** 
 
(0.90)*** 
 
(0.91)*** 
 
(0.89)*** 
 
(1.88)*** 
 
(0.91)*** 
 
∆CIG# × ∆KCFSI + 0.021*** 6.9% -0.000*** 0.0% 0.030*** 10.0% 0.019*** 6.7% 0.034*** 11.4% 0.051*** 18.9% 
  
(1.63)*** 
 
(-0.02)*** 
 
(1.67)*** 
 
(0.94)*** 
 
(1.44)*** 
 
(2.68)*** 
 
∆DTA − -4.834*** 
 
-6.832*** 
 
-4.503*** 
 
-7.526*** 
 
-3.079*** 
 
-5.779*** 
 
  
(-9.36)*** 
 
(-8.75)*** 
 
(-6.54)*** 
 
(-7.38)*** 
 
(-3.40)*** 
 
(-4.38)*** 
 
∆LNSIZE + 2.163*** 
 
1.302*** 
 
2.172*** 
 
1.815*** 
 
1.280*** 
 
1.896*** 
 
  
(8.48)*** 
 
(4.56)*** 
 
(6.73)*** 
 
(4.84)*** 
 
(2.95)*** 
 
(3.26)*** 
 
∆ROA + 1.719*** 
 
3.778*** 
 
1.091*** 
 
3.185*** 
 
0.290*** 
 
2.593*** 
 
  
(2.39)*** 
 
(3.45)*** 
 
(1.22)*** 
 
(2.91)*** 
 
(0.28)*** 
 
(1.47)*** 
 
∆COV + -0.001*** 
 
-0.000*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.008*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
  
(-0.96)*** 
 
(-0.09)*** 
 
(-0.49)*** 
 
(-0.24)*** 
 
(2.45)*** 
 
(-1.03)*** 
 
∆CAP ? 1.376*** 
 
1.219*** 
 
1.461*** 
 
1.875*** 
 
1.732*** 
 
1.878*** 
 
  
(1.73)*** 
 
(1.54)*** 
 
(1.66)*** 
 
(1.77)*** 
 
(1.09)*** 
 
(1.04)*** 
 
∆LOSS − -0.738*** 
 
-0.507*** 
 
-0.589*** 
 
-0.401*** 
 
-0.087*** 
 
-0.512*** 
 
  
(-5.84)*** 
 
(-3.37)*** 
 
(-3.51)*** 
 
(-1.85)*** 
 
(-0.32)*** 
 
(-1.53)*** 
 
∆SUB − -0.347*** 
 
-0.568*** 
 
-0.296*** 
 
-0.099*** 
 
-0.507*** 
 
-0.518*** 
 
  
(-2.20)*** 
 
(-2.57)*** 
 
(-1.17)*** 
 
(-0.29)*** 
 
(-1.58)*** 
 
(-0.92)*** 
 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
3,035* 
 
3,044* 
 
(Pseudo) R2 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.07*** 
 
0.09*** 
 
Sum of the %a 
  
19.7%   0.0% 
 
10.0%   0.0% 
 
34.2%   18.9% 
Supports H2   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  
All models use ordinal logistic regression.  z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
Columns labeled "%" present changes in the odds ratio from a 1 standard deviation increase in the change in earnings guidance disclosure frequency. 
a Odds for insignificant coefficients are deemed zero when summing the odds. 
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Table 17, Panel B examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (∆CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ credit rating scores across changes 
in the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller 
and larger firms.  I expect that an increase earnings guidance disclosure frequency will 
result in an increase in the odds of an improved credit rating score, and that this effect 
will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  In 
Models 1 and 3, the coefficient for the main effect ∆CIG# is positive and significant for 
the smaller-firm subsamples only.  In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient for the interaction 
term ∆CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and significant for the smaller-firm subsample only.  
In Model 3, the coefficient for the interaction term ∆CIG#×∆SLOOS is positive and 
significant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples.  In all Models, the 
combined effect from the main effect (∆CIG#) and the interaction (∆CIG#×∆SLOOS) 
suggests that earnings guidance disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of 
smaller firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which supports 
H2. 
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5.4 Analysis of the Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on Interest Rates Across Credit 
Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
Using the same methodology discussed in section 5.3 above, Equations (1) and 
(2) are estimated for the smallest and largest firms separately where levels and changes 
in INTRATE are used as the dependent variable.  All models include year and industry 
fixed effects, and estimates are based on Roger’s (1993) corrected standard errors 
clustered by firm.  Results from levels-model testing of the effects of conference call and 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency on firms’ interest rates for small and large firms 
are examined in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.  Results from changes-model testing of the 
effects of changes in conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency on 
changes in firms’ interest rates for small and large firms are examined in Sections 5.4.3 
and 5.4.4 20 and 21.   
5.4.1 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure 
Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm 
Size 
Table 18, Panel A examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater conference call 
disclosure frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and that this effect will 
be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  The 
coefficient for the main effect CC# is negative and significant for the larger-firm 
subsample only, and the coefficients for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS are 
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insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples.  The combined effect 
from the main effect (CC#) and the interaction (CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that conference 
call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of larger firms than smaller firms 
even during periods of credit rationing, which does not support H2. 
Table 18, Panel B examines the effect of conference call disclosure frequency 
(CC#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
conference call disclosure frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and that 
this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit 
rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CC# is negative and significant for the 
larger-firm subsample only, and the coefficients for the interaction term ∆CC#×∆SLOOS 
are insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples.  The combined 
effect from the main effect (∆CC#) and the interaction (∆CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that 
conference call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of larger firms than 
smaller firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does not support H2. 
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TABLE 18 
        Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
        
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey 
        
 
   
 
INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
9.492*** 
 
9.265*** 
 
   
 
(12.94)*** 
 
(15.01)*** 
CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.054*** 
 
-0.237*** 
    
 
(-0.92)*** 
 
(-4.38)*** 
CC# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002*** 
    
 
(1.15)*** 
 
(0.78)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.412*** 
 
-1.089*** 
    
 
(-1.29)*** 
 
(-3.34)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.440*** 
 
-0.219*** 
    
 
(-5.83)*** 
 
(-4.94)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.739*** 
 
-0.890*** 
    
 
(-4.29)*** 
 
(-1.47)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(0.49)*** 
 
(-1.55)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.243*** 
 
0.471*** 
    
 
(1.15)*** 
 
(2.99)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.896*** 
 
0.864*** 
    
 
(5.37)*** 
 
(7.02)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.939*** 
 
1.114*** 
 
   
 
(8.52)*** 
 
(10.34)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
9,330* 
 
9,335* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.06*** 
 
0.10*** 
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TABLE 18 (continued) 
        Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
        
 
   
 
INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
9.871*** 
 
8.316*** 
 
   
 
(11.45)*** 
 
(12.93)*** 
CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.231*** 
    
 
(-0.82)*** 
 
(-4.38)*** 
CC# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.023*** 
 
0.011*** 
    
 
(-0.20)*** 
 
(0.12)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.410*** 
 
-1.087*** 
    
 
(-1.29)*** 
 
(-3.34)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.442*** 
 
-0.219*** 
    
 
(-5.86)*** 
 
(-4.93)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.741*** 
 
-0.888*** 
    
 
(-4.30)*** 
 
(-1.47)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(0.48)9*** 
 
(-1.55)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.242*** 
 
0.472*** 
    
 
(1.15)*** 
 
(3.00)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.894*** 
 
0.865*** 
    
 
(5.35)*** 
 
(7.03)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.940*** 
 
1.114*** 
 
   
 
(8.53)*** 
 
(10.34)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
9,330* 
 
9,335* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.06*** 
 
0.10*** 
    
      *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models 
use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See 
Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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5.4.2 Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size 
Table 19, Panel A examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and 
that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit 
rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CIG# is negative and significant for both 
the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples, however the effect is greater for the 
smaller-firm subsample than the larger-firm subsample.  The coefficients for the 
interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS are insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-
firm subsamples.  The combined effect from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction 
(CIG#×∆SLOOS) suggests that earnings guidance disclosure frequency matters more to 
creditors of smaller firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which 
supports H2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
 
TABLE 19 
        Results from Levels-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
        
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
        
 
   
 
INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
10.121*** 
 
9.353*** 
 
   
 
(10.19)*** 
 
(15.86)*** 
CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.041*** 
    
 
(-2.29)*** 
 
(-3.19)*** 
CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.000*** 
    
 
(-1.07)*** 
 
(0.55)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-2.329*** 
 
-1.844*** 
    
 
(-5.65)*** 
 
(-4.81)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.314*** 
 
-0.196*** 
    
 
(-4.05)*** 
 
(-3.89)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.544*** 
 
-0.952*** 
    
 
(-2.59)*** 
 
(-1.28)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(-3.79)*** 
 
(-1.04)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
0.089*** 
 
0.149*** 
    
 
(-0.40)*** 
 
(0.90)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.796*** 
 
0.574*** 
    
 
(4.48)*** 
 
(4.36)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.888*** 
 
1.328*** 
 
   
 
(8.92)*** 
 
(11.72)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
7,306* 
 
7,312* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.09*** 
 
0.15*** 
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TABLE 19 (continued) 
        Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
        
 
   
 
INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
10.114*** 
 
9.352*** 
 
   
 
(10.19)*** 
 
(15.86)*** 
CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.045*** 
 
-0.042*** 
    
 
(-2.17)*** 
 
(-3.19)*** 
CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.017*** 
 
0.005*** 
    
 
(-0.97)*** 
 
(0.54)*** 
DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-2.328*** 
 
-1.844*** 
    
 
(-5.65)*** 
 
(-4.81)*** 
LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.315*** 
 
-0.196*** 
    
 
(-4.06)*** 
 
(-3.88)*** 
ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.547*** 
 
-0.952*** 
    
 
(-2.60)*** 
 
(-1.28)*** 
COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.001*** 
    
 
(-3.79)*** 
 
(-1.04)*** 
CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.090*** 
 
0.148*** 
    
 
(-0.40)*** 
 
(0.90)*** 
LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.795*** 
 
0.574*** 
    
 
(4.48)*** 
 
(4.36)*** 
SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
1.887*** 
 
1.328*** 
 
   
 
(8.92)*** 
 
(11.72)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
7,306* 
 
7,312* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.09*** 
 
0.15*** 
    
      *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models 
use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See 
Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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Table 19, Panel B examines the effect of earnings guidance disclosure frequency 
(CIG#) on firms’ interest rates across changes in the Kansas City Federal Reserve 
Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and larger firms.  I expect that greater 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency will be associated with lower interest rates, and 
that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit 
rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CIG# is negative and significant for both 
the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples, however the effect is greater for the 
smaller-firm subsample than the larger-firm subsample.  The coefficients for the 
interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS are insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-
firm subsamples.  The combined effect from the main effect (CIG#) and the interaction 
(CIG#×∆SLOOS) suggests that earnings guidance disclosure frequency matters more to 
creditors of smaller firms than larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which 
supports H2.  
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5.4.3 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size 
Table 20, Panel A examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger 
firms.  I expect that an increase in conference call disclosure frequency will result in a 
reduction in interest rates, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger 
firms during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CC# are 
negative and significant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples, however 
the effect is greater for the smaller-firm subsample than the larger-firm subsample.  The 
coefficient for the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS is positive and significant for the 
smaller-firm subsample but insignificant for larger-firm subsample.  The combined 
effect from the main effect (CC#) and the interaction (CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that 
conference call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than 
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TABLE 20 
        Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Conference Call Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
        
Panel A: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion 
Survey 
        
 
   
 
∆INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
-0.511*** 
 
-0.061*** 
 
   
 
(-0.73)*** 
 
(-0.22)*** 
∆CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.128*** 
 
-0.066*** 
    
 
(-1.65)*** 
 
(-1.35)*** 
∆CC# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
0.007*** 
 
-0.000*** 
    
 
(2.23)*** 
 
(-0.08)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
0.093*** 
 
-1.590*** 
    
 
(0.14)*** 
 
(-2.64)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-1.068*** 
 
-0.634*** 
    
 
(-3.37)*** 
 
(-2.62)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
0.302*** 
 
-0.917*** 
    
 
(-0.49)*** 
 
(-1.25)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.003*** 
    
 
(-0.47)*** 
 
(2.90)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.599*** 
 
-0.236*** 
    
 
(-0.70)*** 
 
(-0.40)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.355*** 
 
0.125*** 
    
 
(2.09)*** 
 
(1.23)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.192*** 
 
0.173*** 
 
   
 
(0.46)*** 
 
(1.01)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
7,519* 
 
7,523* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.01*** 
 
0.03*** 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
        Panel B: Conference Call Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
        
 
   
 
∆INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
-0.383*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
   
 
(-0.55)*** 
 
(-0.18)*** 
∆CC# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.117*** 
 
-0.056*** 
    
 
(-1.49)*** 
 
(-1.16)*** 
∆CC# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
0.164*** 
 
-0.080*** 
    
 
(1.96)*** 
 
(-1.49)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
0.103*** 
 
-1.581*** 
    
 
(0.15)*** 
 
(-2.63)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-1.074*** 
 
-0.633*** 
    
 
(-3.38)*** 
 
(-2.61)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.271*** 
 
-0.925*** 
    
 
(-0.44)*** 
 
(-1.26)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.003*** 
    
 
(-0.47)*** 
 
(2.90)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.606*** 
 
-0.231*** 
    
 
(-0.71)*** 
 
(-0.40)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.356*** 
 
0.124*** 
    
 
(2.09)*** 
 
(1.22)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.197*** 
 
0.172*** 
 
   
 
(0.47)*** 
 
(1.00)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
7,519* 
 
7,523* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.01*** 
 
0.03*** 
    
      *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models 
use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See 
Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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larger firms even during periods of credit rationing, which supports H2. 
Table 20, Panel B examines the effect of changes in conference call disclosure 
frequency (CC#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and 
larger firms.  I expect that an increase in conference call disclosure frequency will result 
in a reduction in interest rates, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than 
larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficient for the main effect CC# 
is negative and significant for the smaller-firm subsample only, while the coefficient for 
the interaction term CC#×∆SLOOS is positive and significant for the smaller-firm 
subsample and negative and significant for the larger-firm subsample.  The combined 
effect from the main effect (CC#) and the interaction (CC#×∆SLOOS) suggests that 
conference call disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of larger firms than 
smaller firms even during periods of credit rationing, which does not support H2.  
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5.4.4 Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance 
Disclosure Frequency on Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional 
on Firm Size 
Table 21, Panel A examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey (∆SLOOS) for both smaller and larger 
firms.  I expect that an increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will result in a 
reduction in interest rates, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms than larger 
firms during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect CIG# are 
insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples, as are the coefficients 
for the interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS, which provides no support for H2. 
Table 21, Panel B examines the effect of changes in earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency (CIG#) on subsequent changes in firms’ interest rates across changes in the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index (∆KCFSI) for both smaller and 
larger firms.  I expect that an increase in earnings guidance disclosure frequency will 
result in a reduction in interest rates, and that this effect will be greater for smaller firms 
than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.  The coefficients for the main effect 
CIG# are insignificant for both the smaller-firm and larger-firm subsamples, as are the 
coefficients for the interaction term CIG#×∆SLOOS, which provides no support for H2. 
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TABLE 21 
        Results from Changes-model Testing of the Effects of Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency on 
Interest Rates Across Credit Market Conditions Conditional on Firm Size 
        
Panel A: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey 
        
 
   
 
∆INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
0.491*** 
 
-0.726*** 
 
   
 
(0.39)*** 
 
(-0.43)*** 
∆CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.014*** 
 
-0.012*** 
    
 
(-0.54)*** 
 
(-1.17)*** 
∆CIG# × ∆SLOOS 
 
− 
 
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
    
 
(-0.19)*** 
 
(-0.68)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.000*** 
 
-1.576*** 
    
 
(-1.30)*** 
 
(-2.48)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.814*** 
 
-0.607*** 
    
 
(-2.07)*** 
 
(-2.14)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.483*** 
 
-1.545*** 
    
 
(-1.74)*** 
 
(-1.94)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.002*** 
    
 
(0.48)*** 
 
(1.47)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.586*** 
 
-1.010*** 
    
 
(-0.52)*** 
 
(-1.63)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.137*** 
 
0.035*** 
    
 
(0.73)*** 
 
(0.29)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.446*** 
 
0.165*** 
 
   
 
(1.02)*** 
 
(0.75)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
5,739* 
 
5,747* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.02*** 
 
0.03*** 
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TABLE 21 (continued) 
        Panel B: Earnings Guidance Disclosure Frequency and the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress 
Index 
        
 
   
 
∆INTRATE 
VARIABLES  
Sign 
 
 
Smaller Firms 
 
Larger Firms 
Constant    
 
0.489*** 
 
-0.727*** 
 
   
 
(0.39)*** 
 
(-0.43)*** 
∆CIG# 
 
− 
 
 
-0.012*** 
 
-0.011*** 
    
 
(-0.46)*** 
 
(-1.11)*** 
∆CIG# × ∆KCFSI 
 
− 
 
 
-0.025*** 
 
-0.011*** 
    
 
(-0.90)*** 
 
(-1.03)*** 
∆DTA 
 
− 
 
 
-0.996*** 
 
-1.577*** 
    
 
(-1.30)*** 
 
(-2.48)*** 
∆LNSIZE 
 
− 
 
 
-0.817*** 
 
-0.609*** 
    
 
(-2.08)*** 
 
(-2.15)*** 
∆ROA 
 
− 
 
 
-1.476*** 
 
-1.549*** 
    
 
(-1.73)*** 
 
(-1.95)*** 
∆COV 
 
− 
 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.002*** 
    
 
(0.47)*** 
 
(1.47)*** 
∆CAP 
 
? 
 
 
-0.596*** 
 
-1.014*** 
    
 
(-0.52)*** 
 
(-1.64)*** 
∆LOSS 
 
+ 
 
 
0.139*** 
 
0.035*** 
    
 
(0.74)*** 
 
(0.28)*** 
∆SUB 
 
+ 
 
 
0.446*** 
 
0.166*** 
 
   
 
(1.02)*** 
 
(0.75)*** 
Industry Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
   
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations    
 
5,739* 
 
5,747* 
Adj. R2    
 
0.02*** 
 
0.03*** 
    
      *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a 
one-tailed test if the results are consistent with the direction of prediction, and two-tailed otherwise.  All models 
use ordinary least squares regression.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  See 
Appendix B for variable definitions.  Standard errors are clustered by firm (Peterson 2009).  
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5.5 Summary of Results 
 Results from levels- and changes-model testing provide some evidence that the 
influence of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital increases during periods 
of credit rationing.  When firms’ credit ratings are used as the dependent variable, there 
is little evidence that the influence of conference call disclosure frequency increases 
during periods of credit rationing.  There is, however, stronger evidence that the effect of 
earnings guidance disclosure frequency is of greater influence when credit becomes 
constrained.  When firms’ interest rates are used as the dependent variable, there is no 
evidence of an increased effect of conference call disclosure frequency during periods of 
credit rationing and very little evidence of an increased effect of earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency when credit is constrained.   
 Results from levels- and changes-model testing on smaller-firm and larger-firm 
subsamples provide mixed evidence of whether voluntary disclosure has a greater impact 
on firms’ cost of debt capital during periods of credit rationing.  When firms’ credit 
ratings are used as the dependent variable, there is strong evidence that conference call 
disclosure frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than larger firms when  
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credit is rationed.  There is mixed evidence, however, that earnings guidance disclosure 
frequency matters more to creditors of smaller firms than larger firms when credit 
becomes constrained.  When interest rates are used as the dependent variable, there is 
mixed evidence as to whether either measure of voluntary disclosure matters more to 
creditors of smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing.   
 Upon closer examination, it appears that many of the expected effects of 
voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital load insignificantly in models where 
firms’ interest rates are used as the dependent variable.  Pittman and Fortin (2004) note 
that the interest rate variable, as constructed both here and in their study, potentially 
contains noise which makes it difficult to for regression models to pick up effects from 
right-hand side variables.  Future research could examine whether the model used in this 
study is more sensitive to variation in interest rates of different ranks such as 0% to 5%, 
5% to 10%, etc.    
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigates how the observed relationship between firms’ cost of debt 
capital and voluntary disclosure is influenced by credit market conditions.  Prior 
literature indicates that when creditors are pessimistic, credit becomes rationed and 
creditors’ screening and monitoring efforts increase (Rajan 1994; Ruckes 2004).  While 
lenders have access to private information to satisfy information needs during periods of 
forecasted uncertainty (Rajan 1994; Jorion et al. 2005), information acquisition and 
processing is costly (Ruckes 2004; Bonner 2008).  However, borrowers can partially 
subsidize the cost of monitoring by voluntarily disclosing financial information (e.g. 
Lang and Lundholm 1993) suggesting that voluntary disclosure becomes more important 
to creditors when credit is rationed.  Thus, while prior literature finds that greater 
voluntary disclosure reduces firms’ cost of debt capital (Sengupta 1998); I suggest that 
voluntary disclosure will have a greater effect on firms’ cost of debt capital during 
periods of credit rationing. 
Using conference call and earnings guidance disclosure frequency as my proxy 
for voluntary disclosure, I find some evidence that greater conference call disclosure 
frequency improves firms’ credit ratings and reduces firms’ interest rates more during 
periods of credit rationing.  I also find some evidence that greater earnings guidance 
disclosure frequency improves firm’s credit ratings and reduces firms’ interest rates 
more during periods of credit rationing.  These results suggest that the influence of 
voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt capital is greater when credit is constrained. 
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I also examine whether the effect of voluntary disclosure on firms’ cost of debt 
capital during periods of credit rationing is conditional on firm size.  Smaller firms have 
more opaque information environments relative to larger firms (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 
1993) and are more likely to benefit from voluntary disclosure in debt contracting when 
credit is rationed.  I find some evidence that greater conference call and earnings 
guidance disclosure frequency improves firms’ credit ratings and reduces firms’ interest 
rates more for smaller firms than larger firms during periods of credit rationing, 
suggesting that voluntary disclosure is more important to creditors of smaller firms than 
larger firms when credit becomes constrained.   
My study contributes to extant literature by examining how credit market 
conditions affect the relation between voluntary disclosure and the cost of debt capital 
documented in prior literature.  Anecdotal evidence of lax lending standards during the 
“easy credit” period of 2004-2006 (Acharya et al. 2009b) suggests that the importance of 
financial disclosure attenuates during periods of credit abundance.  Prior economic 
literature also finds that screening and monitoring efforts of creditors become more strict 
(lax) during periods of credit rationing (abundance) (e.g. Rajan 1994; Ruckes 2004).  My 
study adds to extant literature by demonstrating that creditors’ use of voluntary 
disclosure varies in degree of influence and direction of association depending on 
whether credit is rationed or abundant, and that this result occurs despite increased 
financial disclosure since the passage of SOX documented in prior literature (Jain et al. 
2008).   
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APPENDIX A 
 
The Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model of credit rationing is simplistic in nature.  Its 
purpose here is to conceptually demonstrate some of the dynamics of credit rationing 
and is not meant to be a depiction of all factors influencing the credit markets at any 
single point in time. 
 
Scenario:  A firm wants to invest in a project but lacks sufficient assets (e.g. cash) to pay 
for the project (i.e. internal capital is insufficient).  The firm chooses outside financing 
(i.e. debt financing) to invest in the project.   
 
Players : Firm (and manager), uninformed investors. 
 
A = firm assets (or capital).  The existing, but insufficient amount of capital the firm is 
able to put up. 
 
I = cost of investment or cost of the project. 
 
A < I = the firm does not have enough collateral to pay for the project. 
 
I – A = the amount the firm needs to borrow from the investors. 
 
pH = the probability of success when the manager of the firm works (i.e. exerts effort). 
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pL = the probability of success when the manager of the firm shirks (i.e. takes private 
benefits).  The taking of private benefits is analogous to the manager acting in a 
way that is not in the best interest of the investor.  Aside from the probability of 
the project failing (i.e. 1 – pH), manager impropriety is the investor’s next biggest 
concern.   
 
∆p = pH – pL > 0 = represents the strength of the signal as to whether the manager has 
worked or shirked.  It is assumed that this probability is known in advance by 
both the manager and investor.   
- If ∆p is high (i.e. high pH and low pL), and the project fails, it will signal to 
the investor that the manager has likely shirked (i.e. that the failures was not 
likely due to misfortune).   
- If the ∆p is low (i.e. pH ≈ pL) and the project failed, it will not be clear 
whether the project failed due to misfortune given the manager worked (i.e. 1 
– pH) or to manager misbehavior given the manager shirked (i.e. 1 – pL).   
 
B = private benefits inured to the manager as a result of shirking (instead of working).  
This also represents the manager’s opportunity cost of working.   
 
γ = the rate of return on investor capital (i.e. the rate of return demanded by investors).  
Represents the opportunity cost (as a percentage) of investing in the firm. 
 
Iγ = the investor’s opportunity cost. 
 
Project outcomes: 
1.  Zero = Failure (zero returns from the project) 
2.  R = Success (project has positive returns) 
 
R = Rf + Ru = total returns from the project are allocated to the firm (Rf) and the investor 
(Ru). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
 
Investment Payoffs (total) 
 
Successful project returns: 
pHR = total project returns from the manager working 
pLR + B = total project returns from the manager shirking (where private benefits are 
inured to the manager only). 
 
pHR – γI > 0… or… 
pHR > γI = the project’s total return (based on the probability of success due to working) 
must be greater than the return from investing that same project capital in another 
investment (i.e. opportunity cost).  This is the necessary condition that must exist 
if investor is to invest in the firm.   
 
 
pLR + B < γI = if the manager shirks, the project’s return, including private benefits must 
be less than the returns from investing the same funds in an alternative project.  
This condition is necessary to force the investor to incentivize the firm / manager 
against shirking. 
 
pHR > γI > pLR + B… or… 
pHR > pLR + B = the summary of the total payoff structure (for both the manager and 
investor). 
 
pHRf > pLRf + B = the manager’s payoff structure, or… 
pHRf – pLRf > B… or… 
Rf (pH – pL) > B… or… 
Rf (∆p) > B… or… 
Rf > B / ∆p = the minimum return (i.e. incentive) demanded by the manager to work.  
The manager’s share of the project’s return must be greater than the private 
benefit inured if the manager shirks 
 
  
117 
 
 
Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
 
R = (B / ∆p) – Ru = total return substituting “B / ∆p” for “Rf”…or… 
Ru = R – (B / ∆p) = the investor’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC).  The return to 
the investor will equal the project’s total return less the incentive to make the 
manager work (and not shirk).  Note, ceteris paribus: 
- As the manager’s private benefit “B” increases, the investor’s proportion of 
the total return “Ru” decreases.  That is, as the temptation to shirk “B” 
increases, the investor will have to give up more of his / her return “Ru” in 
order to incentivize the manager to work (and not shirk).   
- As the signal of manager effort “∆p” decreases, the investor’s proportion of 
the total return “Ru” decreases.  That is, because it is easier for the manager to 
get away with shirking if the signal between working and shirking “∆p” is 
opaque the investor will have to give up more of his / her return “Ru” in order 
to incentivize the manager to work (and not shirk).     
- As the total project return “R” decreases, the investor’s proportion of the total 
return “Ru” decreases.  That is, as the project’s total return decreases the 
residual return to the investor “Ru” after incentivizing the manager to work 
“Rf” also shrinks. 
 
Maximum Pledgeable Income 
 
Ru = R – (B / ∆p) = represents investor’s proportion of the project’s total return… or… 
pHRu = pH[R – (B / ∆p)] = investor’s return given the probability of success from the 
manager working (and not shirking).  Note that “pH[R – (B / ∆p)]” represents the 
investor’s maximum pledgeable income, or the maximum amount that can be 
pledged to the investor without jeopardizing the manager’s incentive to work. 
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γ (I – A) = represents investor’s demanded return given rate of return “γ” and investment 
“I – A”.  This is equal to the investor’s return “pHRu”, or maximum pledgeable 
income, and can be rewritten in the context of the investor’s ICC as… 
γ (I – A) = pH[R – (B / ∆p)]… or… 
I – A = {pH[R – (B / ∆p)]} / γ… or… 
– A = {pH[R – (B / ∆p)]} / γ – I… or… 
A = I –  {pH[R – (B / ∆p)]} / γ… or… 
A ≥ I –  {pH[R – (B / ∆p)]} / γ = the minimum amount of assets (i.e. collateral) that the 
firm must have “A” in order for the investor to put up financing.   to get direct financing 
from investors.  Several things to note from this equation: 
1.  As the project’s investment amount “I” increases, the minimum amount of collateral 
the firm must put up “A” increases.   
2.  As the probability of success from the manager working “pH” decreases, the signal 
between working and shirking “∆p” decreases (or become more opaque), and the 
minimum amount of collateral the firm must put up “A” increases. 
3.  As the total project return “R” decreases, the minimum amount of collateral the firm 
must put up “A” increases. 
4.  As the private benefits available to the manager “B” increases, the minimum amount 
of collateral the firm must put up “A” increases.   
5.  As the required rate of return by the investor “γ” increases, the minimum amount of 
collateral the firm must put up “A” increases. 
 
As Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) discuss, in a credit constrained environment, firms with 
insufficient collateral “A” are rationed from any available credit.  Typically, smaller 
firms are rationed first as larger firms tend to have sufficient collateral “A”.    
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APPENDIX B 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
RATINGS = the score assigned to each firm’s Standard & Poor senior debt rating 
score at the end of period t+1.  See Table 1 for scoring methodology.  Credit 
ratings were obtained from Compustat (variable “splticrm” in the ADSPRATE 
dataset).  Higher values of RATINGS represent higher credit scores and a lower 
cost of debt capital. 
∆RATINGS = the change in each firm’s Standard & Poor senior debt rating score 
from period t to period t+1.  See Table 1 for scoring methodology.  Credit ratings 
were obtained from Compustat (variable “splticrm” in the ADSPRATE dataset).  
Positive values of ∆RATINGS represents an improvement in credit ratings, and, 
generally speaking, going from more negative changes to less negative changes, 
or going from less positive changes to more positive changes represents an 
improvement in credit rating and a lower cost of debt capital. 
INTRATE = each firm’s interest rate for period t+1 calculated as total interest and 
related expense for period t+1 (variable “xint” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) 
divided by average total debt at the end of period t and period t+1 (variables 
“dlc” plus “dltt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) multiplied by 100.  
Methodology follows Francis, et al. (2005) and Pittman and Fortin (2004).  
Higher values of INTRATE represent a higher cost of debt capital. 
∆INTRATE = the change in each firm’s interest rate from period t to period t+1, 
where INTRATE for period t+1 is described above, and INTRATE for period t is 
calculated as total interest and related expense for period t (variable “xint” in the 
Compustat FUNDA dataset) divided by average total debt at the end of period 
t−1 and period t (variables “dlc” plus “dltt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) 
multiplied by 100.  Positive values of ∆INTRATE represent an increase in the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Variables 
 
CC# = the frequency of earnings conference calls held by each firm during period t.  
Higher values represent greater voluntary disclosure. 
∆CC# = the change in the frequency of earnings conference calls held by each firm 
from period t−1 to period t.  Positive values represent an increase in voluntary 
disclosure. 
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CIG# = the frequency of earnings guidance issued by each firm during period t.  
Higher values represent greater voluntary disclosure. 
∆CIG# = the change in the frequency of earnings guidance issued by each firm from 
period t−1 to period t.  Positive values represent an increase in voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Credit Market Condition Variables 
∆SLOOS = the change the average net percentage of bank survey respondents 
reporting tighter credit standards for commercial and industrial loans from period 
t−1 to period t, Table 2 shows the time-series trend in ∆SLOOS.  Positive 
changes represent periods of increased credit rationing. 
∆KCFSI = the change in the Kansas City Federal Reserve Financial Stress Index 
from period t−1 to period t.  Table 2 shows the time-series trend in ∆KCFSI.  
Positive changes represent periods of increased credit rationing. 
 
Control Variables 
 
DTA = firm leverage for period t calculated as the ratio of total debt (variables “dlc” 
plus “dltt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) to total assets (variable “at” in the 
Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of period t.  Higher values represent 
higher leverage. 
∆DTA = the change in firm leverage from period t−1 to period t, where DTA for 
period t is described above, and DTA for period t−1 is calculated as the ratio of 
total debt (variables “dlc” plus “dltt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) to total 
assets (variable “at” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of period t−1.  
Positive changes represent an increase in firm leverage. 
LNSIZE = firm size for period t calculated as the log of 1 plus total assets (variable 
“at” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of period t.  Higher values 
represent larger firms. 
∆LNSIZE = the change in firm size from period t−1 to period t, where LNSIZE for 
period t is described above, and LNSIZE for period t−1 is calculated as the log of 
1 plus total assets (variable “at” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of 
period t−1.  Positive changes represent an increase in firm size. 
ROA = firm profitability for period t calculated as the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items (variable “ib” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) to total 
assets (variable “at” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) from period t−1 to period 
t.  Higher values represent greater firm profitability. 
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∆ROA = the change in firm profitability from period t−1 to period t, where ROA for 
period t is described above, and ROA for period t−1 is calculated as the ratio of 
income before extraordinary items (variable “ib” in the Compustat FUNDA 
dataset) to total assets (variable “at” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) from 
period t−2 to period t−1.  Positive changes represent an increase in firm 
profitability. 
COV = firm debt interest coverage for period t calculated as the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation (variable “oibdp” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) 
to total interest and related expense (variable “xint” in the Compustat FUNDA 
dataset) during period t.  Higher values represent debt interest coverage. 
∆COV = the change in firm debt interest coverage from period t−1 to period t, where 
COV for period t is described above, and COV for period t−1 is calculated as the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation (variable “oibdp” in the Compustat 
FUNDA dataset) to total interest and related expense (variable “xint” in the 
Compustat FUNDA dataset) during period t−1.  Positive changes represent an 
increase in debt interest coverage. 
CAP = firm capital intensity for period t calculated as the ratio of gross property 
plant and equipment (variable “ppegt” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the 
end of period t divided by total assets (variable “at” in the Compustat FUNDA 
dataset) at the end of period t.  Higher values represent greater firm capital 
intensity. 
∆CAP = the change in firm capital intensity from period t−1 to period t, where CAP 
for period t is described above, and CAP for period t−1 is calculated as the ratio 
of gross property plant and equipment (variable “ppegt” in the Compustat 
FUNDA dataset) at the end of period t−1 divided by total assets (variable “at” in 
the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of period t−1.  Positive changes 
represent an increase in firm capital intensity. 
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LOSS = firm net loss indicator for period t where LOSS equals 1 if income before 
extraordinary items (variable “ib” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) is less than 
or equal to zero for period t, and zero otherwise. 
∆LOSS = the change in firm net loss indicator from period t−1 to period t, where 
LOSS for period t is described above, and LOSS for period t−1 equals 1 if income 
before extraordinary items (variable “ib” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) is 
less than or equal to zero for period t−1, and zero otherwise.  Positive changes 
represent a firm going from a net profit in the prior period to a net loss in the 
current period. 
SUB = firm subordinated debt indicator for period t where SUB equals 1 if a firm has 
subordinated debt (variable “ds” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at the end of 
period t, and zero otherwise. 
∆SUB = the change in firm subordinated debt indicator from period t−1 to period t, 
where SUB for period t is described above, and SUB for period t−1 equals 1 if a 
firm has subordinated debt (variable “ds” in the Compustat FUNDA dataset) at 
the end of period t−1, and zero otherwise.  Positive changes represent a firm 
going from having no subordinated debt in the prior period to having 
subordinated debt in the current period. 
Industry Fixed Effects = firms are assigned 1 of 17 industry classification codes 
based their individual 4-digit SIC code and the Fama-French 17 industry 
classification schema. 
Year Fixed Effects = where each year is assigned its own indicator variable equal to 
1 if the firm’s fiscal year equals the indicator variable year, and zero otherwise. 
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